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ABSTRACT

This work examines the role of indeterminacy and otherness in the totality of what is
here described as Aristotelian Science. Relying on the Aristotelian opposition
between the static, changeless one of Parmenides and the dynamic flux of Heraclitus,
Aristotle's simultaneous foundation of change and knowledge is discussed, and it is
argued that Aristotle uses certain limited conceptions of otherness and indeterminacy
within his scientific system as a means of guaranteeing change without thereby
undermining the determinacy of being required for knowledge. The author's
contention is that Aristotle limits the otherness and indeterminacy found in his work,
and in so doing, falls into a kind of monism with respect to the totality of order and
rationality, the unity present in all beings and the exclusion of the other from the
system. The proof of this occurs through both rational and empirical arguments.
Examinations of Aristotelian theory, and theory of science, as well as minute analyses
of Aristotle's 'indeterminate' conceptions of matter, potential, the accidental, the
other, monstrosity and infinity, show that there is in fact no real otherness in
Aristotle's work, and that this is necessary for the possibility of his conception of
science. But the loss of this otherness, and the consequent subsumption of everything
into an ordered sphere, leaves Aristotle in a sort of metaphysical monism. The
emphasis here is overwhelmingly on the Aristotelian text.

v

INTRODUCTION

"And swift, past understanding swift, the splendor of the earth whirls past" (Gabriel,
Faust l, 1).
"The history of madness would be the history of the Other--of that which for a given
culture is at once interior and foreign, therefore to be excluded (so as to exorcise the
interior danger) but by being shut away (in order fo reduce its otherness); whereas the
history of the order imposed on things would be the history of the Same--of that
which, for a given culture, is both dispersed and related, therefore to be distinguished
by kinds and to be collected together into identities. And if one considers that disease
is at one and the same time disorder--the existence of a perilous otherness within the
human body, at the very heart of life--and a natural phenomenon, with its own
constants, resemblances and types .... From the limit-experience of the Other ...
It was upon this threshold that the strange figure of knowledge called man first
appeared and revealed a space proper to the human sciences" (The Order of Things,
Michel Foucault, xxiv).
For Aristotle, indeterminacy and otherness present the most radical challenge to
knowledge. Unrestrained they would destroy all knowledge, abolishing unity,
identity, opposition and the limit. For this reason, Aristotle is obsessed with them
and they appear constantly in his work in their many forms--positively, in potentiality,
chance, change, matter, the accidental, the monstrous, the infinite, the many and the
other; negatively, in discourse, the actual, determinacy, the limit and the one.
Aristotle's problematic, originally framed by Plato, opposes the unity and static nature
of the Parmenidean/Melissean ontology with the indeterminacy and radical otherness-or absence of non-contradictory identity--of the Cratylean/Heraclitean ontology. Like
Plato, Aristotle argues for a reconciliation of the binary opposition by melding the
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unity of the Parmenidean solution with the plurality and otherness of the Heraclitean,
through a separation (in this case, formal) between the spheres of appearance and
reality.

Instead of ignoring the possibility of indeterminacy and otherness, like many

modem philosophers, and thereby allowing them to subvert the completeness of his
system, Aristotle attempts to co-opt them by including them within his universal
system. Hence, in allowing the existence of otherness and indeterminacy, he is careful
to insure that their appearance will take some knowable form, for although
indeterminacy and otherness may be said in many senses, they are not said, and
perhaps cannot be said, in an unqualified sense. By consigning them to the realm of
the inessential, and, then, placing limits on them even within this sphere, Aristotle is
able to provide an alternative to the either/or of the Parmenidean/Heraclitean
opposition, and to the Platonic theory of forms, allowing for change, while at the
same time retaining the possibility of knowledge of things in the world, that is,
retaining the ontological order and systematicity of Aristotelian science. But
Aristotle's solution involves the limitation of indeterminacy and otherness to the point
of changing their very essence. Though a very restricted notion of otherness is
necessary for his scientific system, in order for there to be change, the logic of
Aristotelian science is incompatible with the possibility of any real indeterminacy or
otherness, for they are of a nature to undermine system and the entire ordered
framework on which it is based. Thus, Aristotle conceives of them in such a way as
to make possible their inclusion within the totality of his scientific system of causal
explanations, and in so doing Aristotle falls prey to a certain monism that excludes
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radical otherness completely. This is not to say that he fully rationalizes and delimits
all of the indeterminacy and radical otherness that he finds in his system. However,

that which remains is traceable not to his willingness to permit indeterminacy, but
rather to his failure or unwillingness to account for the totality of relations (causes)
within the universe via a grand plan or a theory of natural laws.

CHAPTER ONE--OTHERNESS AND INDETERMINACY
The role and meaning of otherness and indeterminacy in Aristotle cannot
be understood in isolation from their purpose within his scientific system.
Indeterminacy and otherness are concepts which, prior to Aristotle, seemed
purely destructive of rational knowledge, for they corrode the limit, and with it,
the unity, totality, distinct identity and difference, and temporal and physical
continuity necessary for universal, eternal, continuous knowledge. This is not to
say that they are incompatible with all conceptions of knowledge. Attempts were
made, for instance, to link the Heraclitean ontology with a Protagorean
epistemology, in the Theaetetus, but these concerned a radically different
conception of knowledge. Knowledge, conceived as objective and universal, as
in Plato and Aristotle, becomes possible only if otherness and indeterminacy are
excluded entirely from the system, limited, or situated within an inessential or
superficial realm of being, for untamed they destroy all constancy, self-identity,
unity, opposition and limit. Hence, the place of indeterminacy and otherness in
the ontologies of Anaxagoras, Heraclitus, Parmenides, Plato and Aristotle,
among others, is seen as crucial to their epistemologies.
As always, we must begin again, in our discussion of indeterminacy and
otherness, with the oft-posited opposition between the dynamic system of Heraclitus
and the static system of Parmenides. In the Heraclitean system, indeterminacy and
4
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otherness are ever-present in the sensible world, though possibly excluded from the
deeper logos of the system; in the Parmenidean system, they are excluded completely,
but indeterminacy is retained in a sense, for the exclusion of otherness entails the
exclusion of all division, limit and identity. Hence, in both cases the (non-)presence
of indeterminacy and otherness on the level of being is thought to make knowledge of
things in the world impossible, for if being is indeterminate, then it cannot be
inquired into. Aristotle's solution is a synthesis of the two approaches. In order to
lay the world open for scientific knowledge, he includes indeterminacy and otherness
within the totality of his system, but he does so by giving form, unity, limit and order
to their unlimited, indefinable nature. Their new form is limited, and their purpose is
to provide a response to the pre-Socratic ideas of flux and unity.
The Heraclitean idea of the world first illustrates the problem of change with
respect to scientific knowledge. According to the standard view of Heraclitus, his
account subverts the possibility of knowledge. The tradition has him say that
everything is in flux, that there is no constant referent, no measured unity to this
world of appearances, and, though he hints at a deep logos lying beneath the surface
and unifying everything, Plato and Aristotle find his account destructive of all
knowledge, as long as this shifting world of appearances is conceived as the only
reality. For Protagoras, this account of existence is not incompatible with knowledge,
though surely knowledge of quite an odd sort, but the intelligibility of such an attempt
is not broadly acknowledged. Thus, Plato, in the Theaetetus, represents the tradition
ably in this matter when he dismisses the Protagorean attempts to base an
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epistemology on the Heraclitean ontology, and argues that no epistemology can be
supported by an account of being as constantly in flux. For Plato and Aristotle,
Heraclitus' account asserts that the objects of experience are without lasting identity,
limit or border--shapeless, indeterminate and ungraspable. Aristotle ascribes to
Heraclitus the view "that all that is has its being essentially in movement" or in
"ceaseless flux" (405a27). In Ovid's formulation, "omnia mutantur; omniafluunt;
quod faimus aut sumus, eras non erimus. " All things change; all things flow; what we
were or are, tomorrow we will not be. This idea that the world is in continual change
gives free rein to indeterminacy, overthrowing the inviolable law of non-contradiction
(Metaph. IV.6, 101 la16-b23; XI.5, 1061b34-1062b10)--in claiming that
contradictories are at the same time true of the same thing--and removing the
underlying basis for definition--the stable essence. The defined is the changeless, and,
if everything is changing, then nothing can be defined. By removing the possibility of
real limitation that is not overflowed by change, at least in the sensible world,
Heraclitus precludes all identification and contradiction, according to Aristotle. His
conception that opposite statements are true of the same things means that no
predication whatsoever is possible, for it predicates everything of everything (Physics,
185b20), and this "utterly destroy[s] rational discourse" (Metaph.XI.5,1062bl0). The
Heraclitean form of change is unlimited, at least with regard to the sensible world; it
extends to all things, whether necessary or contingent, mixing them together and
obscuring their qualities. For Heraclitus, one can never step into the same river twice
(1010a14), and Cratylus, extending this remark, claims that one cannot even do it
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once (1010al4). The Heraclitean conception of continual essential change makes this
impossible, because it obviates the possibility of even defining the river as a 'this', as
a particular thing. In the raging diversity of appearances, the possibility of the
separation and opposition required for identity is mooted, and all is mixed together, in
Anaxagorean fashion, and indistinguishable. "[A]s <one and> the same thing, there
is present < in us? > living and dead and the waking and the sleeping and young and
old. For the latter, having changed around, are the former, and the former, having
changed around, are <back> again <to being> the latter" (Heraclitus, frag. 88,
p.53). The meaning of such statements, however, may not be that which has been
asserted by the tradition. To begin with, the celebrated panta rei--the claim that all is
in flux--is not among the authenticated fragments ("Heraclitus and Parmenides," Jean
Beaufret, in Heidegger on Heraclitus, p. 71). In the fragments, Heraclitus asserts the
existence of a logos or a measure beneath this world of ceaseless change, and "the
immutability of the measures which never stop ruling is more radical than the
movement or change" (ibid.). This is certainly not the traditional view of Heraclitus.
And yet, this conception is not easily assimilable to traditional views of knowledge,
for its God is polemos, ceaseless conflict, a god constantly undergoing alteration, like
fire (ibid., p. 72, fragment 85), and its unity is one in which the measure "is the same
and the other at the same time, in the bosom of a unity where difference constantly
breaks through" (ibid., p. 71). This being said, whether we assume the traditional
view of Heraclitus, or base our view strictly on the fragments, the Heraclitean
conception of the world as indeterminacy and radical otherness, if extended to all
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being, destroys the possibility of a traditional conception of knowledge, for it
imagines a world constantly becoming other to 'itself', mixed together with all else-its identity being nothing but radical otherness--indeterminate and without bounds.
What remains falls far short of the requirements for knowledge, at least by
Aristotle's standard. For something to be an object of knowledge or thought it must
be unchanging, or at least admit of a rational causal explanation depicting the basis,
mode, and end towards which it changes. "[E]very definition and every science is of
universals" (Metaph.XI.4, 1059b25), and if no constant universals remain, there is no
knowledge. Hence, Aristotle argues that one can have "no knowledge of things in a
state of flux" (Metaph.XIII.4, 1078bl6-18). If Heraclitus is right and everything is in
flux, then there is no knowledge of things in the world. The 'foundation' of this
indeterminacy is otherness, or the absence of unity or presence. Heraclitus seemed to
deny the existence of all unity in the world; for him there was thought to be only
otherness and difference--there are many, but no One. Or, rather, "all is one," which
is to say the same thing, for the constant flux obviates the possibility of identity, and
thus of differentiating between things (Heraclitus, fragment 50, "panta einai"). Thus,
sheer indeterminacy and radical otherness are characteristic of the Heraclitean
paradigm. But this view is completely incompatible with Aristotle's vision of the
world, for his purpose is not to undermine knowledge, but to exhibit its content and
grounds.
Aristotle's goal is scientific; he explains things and events in the world via an
account of their causes and essences. Scientific knowledge is attained through·
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acquaintance with objects of inquiry that "have principles, conditions, or elements"
(Phys. l84al). Science requires the unity and order of originary conditions. It is the

knowledge, or episteme, of the constant order of causes of being. "[W]e think we
know, only when we have ascertained the causes" (Metaph.II.2, 994b29), that is the
material, formal, efficient and final causes. This notion of a rationality existing
within the world, and rationally unifying all change, requires precisely that this
change occur according to fixed, limited rules, with a basic unity (the order and
rationality of nature and art, and the substratum) underlying the differences seen in
change. As a result, Aristotle cannot accept an account of the world as indeterminate
and radically other, even in some of its aspects, for this would unravel the
universality and continuity of the network of causes. Indeterminacy and otherness in
this radical form are simply not part of his system, and rightly so, for it is their
nature to defy the totality and completeness of system. They are Protean; they elude
the attempts of mind to grasp and unify them, to give them form and limits. The
basic opposition between the timeless, unchanging universals of knowledge and the
indeterminacy of constantly changing things in the world has for this reason been the
theme of philosophy from Plato and the pre-Socratics to the present. Seeking to
break through the ever-changing appearances of the sensible world, Faust laments,
"[e]ternal nature, where shall I grasp you?" (Faust I, 13). For Cratylus, essences or
eternal nature cannot be grasped at all, for being is indeterminate, and this
indeterminacy precludes the possibility of knowledge. The apparent indeterminacy of
the sensible world seems to rule out the possibility of science. To overcome this
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problem, a scientific system has to account for change, while at the same time
demonstrating the existence of an ontological sphere in which being is sheltered from
this indeterminacy and radical otherness. But while the alternative system entirely
accounts for indeterminacy and otherness, by excluding them, it does so at the cost of
excluding the possibility of change. Heraclitus' position would seem, then, to hold
some common-sense attraction for a scientist like Aristotle, who seeks rational
explanations for the changes observed in nature, because it at least admits that there is
change. Change must be accounted for, and not as something extraneous or
accidental, as in some of the followers of Parmenides, but as something fundamental
to the nature (physis) of things, for Aristotle argues that "it is characteristic of matter
to suffer action, i.e. to be moved" (de Gen. et Corr., 336b30). Heraclitus, then, who
determines change and strife as essential characteristics of being, is able to allow for
change and the otherness that makes it possible.
But Aristotle offers the pluralist Heraclitus and his followers only invective and
ridicule. Heraclitus asserts that all things change, but then can say nothing about it.
Having failed to limit indeterminacy in the world of appearances, he seems, to
Aristotle and Plato, to destroy the possibility of knowledge, as long as that is equated
with the knowledge of sensibles. For Plato, it is questionable whether there is any
practical knowledge; his questions seek after the essences of things and dismiss the
importance and wisdom of worldly actions and change. But for Aristotle, knowledge
of the relations governing the sensible world is essential. His disregard for
Heraclitus, then, is caused by his perception that Heraclitus' view makes knowledge
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of the sensible world impossible. Heraclitus' doctrine prevents him from resolving
the oppositions and continual conflict of this world, or of saying anything positive, in
the fragments, about the state of nature--except that it changes and that there is an
underlying logos to this change--that change is measured (Heraclitus, frag.31b) and
that "all things happen in accordance with this account" (ibid., fragment 1, p.11)--and
he is unable or unwilling to provide a workable definition of change.
Paradoxically, it is Parmenides, with his notions of unity and a static universe,
who provides Aristotle with a notion of change--to become other. But he also says
that being is one, that "all things that are are one and this is being"
(Metaph. l00la35). This means that there is no otherness, for all things are one, and

consequently, there is no change. "One and unchanging is that for which as a whole
the name is: 'to be"' (fragment 20). Whether this means that Parmenides recognizes
the appearance of mobility and argues that it is only an appearance, or that
Parmenides believes that the mobility of things does not rule out the immobility of the
whole--as in Lukacsian realism--remains in question. According to Beaufret, "[a]t
bottom there is probably as little immobilism in the poem of Parmenides as there is
mobilism in the fragments of Heraclitus. . . . we find permanence and change in both
Heraclitus and Parmenides" (Heidegger on Heraclitus, p.85). Nonetheless, the
problematic, for Aristotle, concerns such a duality between the permanence of
Parmenides and the change of Heraclitus. Other monists, rephrasing the problematic,
soften the Parmenidean picture--or do more justice to it--and come somewhat closer to
Aristotle's position, arguing that there is no change other than alteration, for "the
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underlying something always remains identical and one" (de Gen. et Corr.314b2).
The basic argument, however, of a monistic view is that the otherness of change is
impossible. To become other (whether at all or in the underlying substratum) is
impossible within the realm of being, if being is one, for to become other would be to
become other to being. This is to pass into non-being. To change from A to B, then,
would require that A be destroyed and become non-being. B would not be generated
from A, but from nothing. This, however, is manifestly absurd. Nothing can come
from what is not. Hence, Parmenides argues that there is no change at all. He
asserts that "it is changeless . . . remaining the same and in the same state . . .
perpetually" (fragment 8, 26-30). For Aristotle this assertion is obviously wrong. He
looks to the world, sees change, and terms this an essential property of matter, and so
he is naturally dissatisfied with Parmenides' account, for the latter does not only deny
the possibility of change, but he also excludes the possibility of all predication and
knowledge by denying the possibility of otherness. According to Parmenides, it "is
immovable and complete ... Nor is it divisible, since it all alike is" (fragment 8c).
In the absence of the differentiation and combination that is made possible by
otherness, there can be no knowledge, as Plato understands in the Sophist (252).
Truth and discourse would be impossible "if we had yielded the point that there is no
blending of any form with one another" (Sophist, 260b). But division is also
necessary, for without it there would be no otherness, and it would be impossible to
separate one from an other. Difference must be present in being, for "[i]f it does not
blend with them, everything must be true, but if it does, we shall have false thinking
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and discourse" (Sophist, 260c). Without otherness, "[o]ne path only is left for us

to

speak of: that it is ... for it is not to be said or thought that it is not" (Parmenides,
fragment 8a). Nothing can be predicated of beings if there is only the one and nothing
can be predicated of that which is not being, for "[o]ne cannot legitimately utter the
words, or speak or think of that which just simply is not; it is unthinkable, not to be
spoken of or uttered or expressed" (Sophist, 238c). Unlimited otherness destroys all
knowledge, but so does the absence of otherness.
Aristotle, assuming the existence of both change and knowledge, would argue
that Parmenides fails in two respects: he fails the empirical test--for experience shows
that there is change--and he fails to account for the knowledge that actually exists. His
problem is essentially that he ignores otherness, a problem which Aristotle believes he
has overcome with his equivocations in the senses of being and his separation between
the individual and the universal. By asserting that being is one, Parmenides is forced
to conclude that otherness is non-being. Monism is not itself a unified 'movement',
finding its unity in various realms, though it does have the common denominator of
finding a oneness pervading the universe in some way, eliminating the possibility of
an otherness beyond unity. The diversity of these monisms should be recognized,
however, in preparation for the characterization of Aristotle as a monist. The
Parmenidean monism is one of the definition, for "Parmenides seems to fasten on that
which is one in definition," while Melissus fastens "on that which is one in matter"
(Metaph.1.5, 986bl8). In either case, such a monistic explanation of being has to

deny the evidence of the senses that there is change, that the universe is dynamic. But
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the alternative, a pluralistic system like that of Heraclitus, fails to explain knowledge,
for it lacks the unity, stability and the limit provided by a natural order characterized
by both unity and difference, and division and combination. Both positions deny the
possibility of knowledge of the sensible, but the opposition is normally imagined as an
either/or between intelligibility and change. Parmenides and Heraclitus present us
with a dilemma: "either change or intelligibility, but not both" (Veatch, 28). The
solution, for Aristotle as for Plato, is in a golden mean between the two accounts.
There is change, Aristotle concludes, but an explanation of it cannot turn on a
situation in which there are no verities, no forms (in the world) unaffected by change.
The things of the world must not be merely individuals, but must also be ordered by
universal rational ends, and causes that always have the same result. A thing must
have this universal, rational unchanging essence or substance in the world if there is
to be knowledge, for "[i]f there is nothing apart from individuals, there will be no
object of thought, but all things will be objects of sense, and there will not be
knowledge of anything" (Metaph.999b2-4). A constant measure--a universal free of
the indeterminacy of this world--must be present in sensible things if there is to be
knowledge, and this requires that there be something distinct from this changing
world of individuals. It requires a separation between the particular individuals of
this world and universals, for there is no knowledge of individuals per se. Knowledge
is of the universal, which involves explanation; "[t]he universal is more knowable in
the order of explanation, the particular in the order of sense; for explanation has to do
with the universal, sense with the particular" (Phys.189a5). By conceiving, like
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Plato, of a separation, in this case formal, between appearances and reality, Aristotle
allows for change without disqualifying the determinacy and unity required for
knowledge. This accurately addresses the problem, for a scientific explanation of
being must account for change and otherness and yet retain the essential stability and
unity necessary for knowledge.
The scientific solution to the problems raised by Heraclitus and Parmenides
turns on the question of indeterminacy and otherness. If unlimited, they undermine
the possibility of the order required for knowledge; if excluded, they make change
impossible. The order of knowledge is founded on the order of being. If being is
indeterminate, a realm of radical otherness, then it cannot stand as the basis for an
ordered knowledge. And this applies to any true indeterminacy and otherness, for
any disruption of the ordered relations of the system impacts upon them all in that
they are all connected together somehow. "For as it belongs in all cases to one and
the same science to deal with correlated subjects . . . it follows that natural science
will have to include the whole universe in its province" (Parts of Animals, 641b1).
Science must be able to have a totality of explanations if it is to have any, for
indeterminacy or radical otherness within a single case overflows the borders of the
determined, spreading to related cases and undermining the entire causal network,
even bringing into question the unity and order of nature. Nor can the unlimited be
present within the causal network, in the form of an infinite series, for those who
allow such a series "destroy science; for it is not possible to have this till one comes
to the unanalyzable terms. And knowledge becomes impossible" (Metaph.11.2,
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994b21). Hence, indeterminacy and otherness must be limited in their nature or
excluded from the realm that is considered true being, if there is to be knowledge.
Aristotle, Plato and Heraclitus all take this approach.
Science, for Aristotle, is ordered knowledge of ordered being [here I am not
equating all being with a single hypostatized Parmenidean being]; hence, science
requires an ontological basis for the order seen in change. This order must not be
merely a product of the mind's rationalizing of being--it must not be the product of a
logos situated in the observer but not in the observed; the order must be present on

the level of being. Hence, Aristotle's view should not be reduced to a linguistic
perspectivism, which views the mind's logos as the source of the order observed in
science. Aristotle, as a scientist, believes that the order is in being, arguing that
"there is an Order controlling all things" (de Gen. 336bl2). He seeks not to give
order to the things, but, as Heidegger and Owens have observed, to allow the order
of knowledge to mirror the order present on the level of beings, to let the beingness
of things shine forth (phainesthai) and reveal itself (a-letheia), to allow beings to let
themselves be known (Owens, 62-3). The prerequisite of truth for Aristotle, as for
Plato in the Sophist, is the ordered combination and separation of being, the division
of the one (the primal ousia to which all being refers) into many and the combination
of the many into one, and although both are necessary, the one has the priority, for
science requires identity. "For Aristotle it is the opposites, as constituents of our
differentiated world, which have actual existence, while the primeval One from which
they once emerged, is essentially their 'not yet' or potentiality, and from this point of
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view it makes little difference whether it be material substrate, migma or apeiron"
(Seligman, 46).

Phenomenally, we are given not the prime matter--the one--which

does not admit of the measure or the limit, but the opposites that arise from the
potentiality of the one to be separated and combined, as in the logos apophantikos.
The presence of this inherent oppositionality--as opposed to a strict continuity without
limit in being--makes knowledge and truth possible. Truth "depends, on the side of
the objects, on their being combined or separated, so that he who thinks the separated
to be separated and the combined to be combined has the truth, while he whose
thought is in a state contrary to that of the objects is in error" (Metaph. IX.10,
1051bl). "And truth means knowing these objects" (1052a2). Knowledge depends
on the order of the objects, not on the nature of the perceiver.
The way in which these objects change must also be ordered, according to
rational nature--the internal and external causes of change must be ordered and
teleological. Hence, Aristotle argues that the rational nature is expressed in the
external relations between things and in the internal movements of things.
"[E]verything that Nature makes is means to an end. For just as human creations are
the products of art, so living objects are manifestly the products of an analogous
cause or principle, not external but internal, derived like the hot and the cold from the
environing universe" (Parts of Animals, 64lbll). The end or final cause is the
reason present in the thing, and the determination of this reason is the goal for
science, whether in art or nature, for "the reason forms the starting point, alike in the
works of art and in works of nature" (PA, 639bl4). This "order and definiteriess" is
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more obvious in the celestial bodies than in changing perishable bodies here on earth,
whose motions seem to be governed by chance and spontaneity, but a definite order
governs in both the static celestial bodies and the dynamic sensible things (64lb18).
This is not to attribute pure necessity to everything. Indeed, we must not be too hasty
in dismissing the role of chance and otherness, and attributing an ordered pattern to
everything, for Aristotle denied determinism (Preus, 191, cf.Int. 9) and argued that
"there is contingency even apart from human action" (Ross, 80). However, this
contingency is not incompatible with science.
Scientific investigation is of the necessary, and it depends on the determinacy
of the totality, and so this realm of contingency appears to constitute an exception to
this totality, undermining all explanation.

But the relations by which all things

change are determinable by scientific investigation, because this order admits of
relative, or hypothetical, and strict necessity, both of which are in keeping with the
causal explanation of events. The order of objects must be necessary, for "the object
of scientific knowledge is of necessity" (Nie.Ethics, 1139b22), whether this be the
absolute necessity of eternal nature or the hypothetical necessity of other parts of
nature (Ross, 78). The method of science requires necessary objects, but this
necessity need not be in the strict sense. We must show that respiration, for instance,
takes place with a certain final object, "and that part of the process is necessitated by
this and that other stage of it" (PA, 642a31). But this necessity admits of a rather
extended definition. "By necessity we shall sometimes mean hypothetical necessity,
the necessity, that is, that the requisite antecedents shall be there, if the final ehd is to
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be reached" and sometimes the absolute necessity connecting substances (642a33).
Absolute necessity concerns eternal phenomena, but natural and artificial things also
admit of a certain necessity, because they are the product of a rational order.
"[T]here is hypothetical necessity manifested in everything that is generated by nature
as in everything that is produced by art, be it a house or what may" (639b24).
Underlying both is the natural order, the way in which things naturally occur
according to definite reasons, given a certain set of antecedent circumstances. This
natural order underlies the necessity of substantial relations as well as the hypothetical
necessity of events thought to occur accidentally. Thus, Aristotle meets the
requirements for science by arguing that the needed order is in fact present, and that
it extends beyond the essences, or necessary ends and objects of things, to accidental
events. The object of science is the examination of the necessary, the essential, and
this is manifested in the four causes, but the extension of necessity to the hypothetical
necessity of nature means that science can also examine that which does not happen
always or for the most part--the accidental--because the rational order underlies both
absolutely and hypothetically necessary acts. This rationality is apparent in the
necessity of the sequential relations connecting given events and in the universality of
the formal and final causes. The primary object of science, the essential, is manifest
in the changeless formula--the substance of a thing (in the limited sense of substance)-and is equivalent to the formal and final causes, for "[t]he formal and at the same
time the final cause is 'the formula expressing the essential nature' of the things that
come to be" (Ross, 107). As Aristotle says, "the form or the archetype [is] the
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statement of the essence, and its genera" (Phys.194b27). And this means that
substance in the sense of the formula is identical to essence. But this is the object of
science, "a rational formula" (Meta.1046b7). The foundation of science, then, must
come from the essential order and rationality of being.
Being, for Aristotle, is essentially ordered--" all things are ordered together
somehow" (1075a16)--and this order and reason, which provide the ontological basis
for science, is manifested in the essences. In other words, there is a reason in things.
Being itself is ordered; it "falls immediately into genera" (1004a5). Hence, Aristotle
approves of Anaxagoras' idea that "reason [is] present--as in animals, so throughout
nature--as the cause of order and of all arrangement" (984bl4-16). Reason [logos] is
present throughout nature, although it is not necessarily present in everything, for the
lower elements, as individuals, may behave randomly while the whole is rational
(1075a23).
This appearance of randomness cannot, however, be characteristic of the basic
structure, for a scientific account of the world can allow no unexplainable
indeterminacy and otherness into the system, and Aristotle eventually explains away
this indeterminacy. Science, in the traditional sense, requires that something be in a
steady state, that there be constant rules by which to organize the past and inductively
predict the future, whether it be the laws of the relations between things, as in prequantum science, or the essences of the things in Aristotelian science. This does not
entail the absence of 'creative' premises and principles, which are not themselves
proved, or new rules, but it does require a certain unity and oppositional identity.
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There must be division and classification--in short, a rational order. Aristotle's
specific project of science, at least as described in the Posterior Analytics, is proof, or
demonstration, and the drawing of borders or limits, i.e. definition. As Novak's title
claims, Aristotle's method is definition and demonstration. Hence, his view of
science extends beyond strict demonstration, even to those things that happen for the
most part (Leszl, 64). Because being is ordered, and thus already limited and
distinguished, a certain ontological foundation exists already for the second function
of science--definition (logos, horismos, horos (Novak, 21)). The prior determinacy of
being allows the assumption, not the proof, of definitions, and this is necessary for
science, for one needs to start somewhere. "A science, on Aristotle's account,
assumes the definition of its terms" and proves the rest (Leszl, 66). Scientific
knowledge is attained by acquaintance with the "principles, conditions, or elements"
of objects of an inquiry (Phys. l84a9-l0). It requires knowledge of the "primary
conditions or first principles" (184a13). These vary, but there are commonalities that
run through the sciences. "Though each science is distinct and has its own principles
or starting points, there are certain principles which are common to all the sciences,"
the axioms (axiomata, Post.An. 77a26) and the common principles (koinai archai,
88b28) (Novak, 4). These axioms have a metaphysical justification, for they "are
presupposed by any scientific knowing," and only metaphysics, "which does not have
the restricted scope of the particular sciences (Metaph., XI, 4)," can justify these
overarching axioms (Novak, 4-5--the words are Novak's, the reference is in his text).
The scientific method, then, has certain metaphysical justifications, and these allow it
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to overflow the limits of the regional sciences. But the specific principles of each
science have an ontological basis; they are of the order of things, for "the existence
of different principles depends on the existence of different genera" (Leszl, 72).
Different genera demand different principles, for they do not have a unity, and so it
was thought that there was no science that overflowed the boundaries of this unity, no
universal science that concerned all genera (Leszl, 71). "[N] atural science, like other
sciences, is in fact about one class of being," (Meta. l025bl9) not about all classes at
once--though universal mathematics "applies alike to all" (1026a27). And yet within
each of these realms, there is a unity, and this unity overflows the somewhat arbitrary
borders between disciplines, taking the entire universe for its object (64lbl). Science
is based on a unity, a basic order, and so each science concerns a single genus, a
single class of things identical in one particular respect. "A genus is what ultimately
distinguishes one science from another" (Novak, 4).
If no universal science exists, then, it is because no unity obtains between

genera--genera are radically other to each other--and so it is "a condition of scientific
knowledge
... that all the terms conform in some way to one definition" (Leszl, 83). In other
words, as befits Aristotle's supposedly empiricist methodology, each science must be
directed specifically to the nature of the inquiry and the subject matter, and since a
unity does not inhere between genera, each science will be limited to a specific region
of being. There will not be an overarching science that sweeps through all categories
of being, and thus there will not be, it seems, any view of Science in general in
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Aristotle, such as the one described in these pages. Such a metaphysical conception
of science would contradict Aristotle's empirical method. For this reason, according
to a conventional view, Aristotle did not leave us a tractatus on science, but merely
separate works within the narrow fields of the various sciences.
And yet Aristotle invests his account(s) of science with a certain univocity
throughout his work that cannot be explained away. In many places, his accounts of
science are not delimited, but speak of science in general, and this is clear even
within his argument that science requires a unity, and that it therefore cannot extend
beyond a given genus, for this argument still relies on a certain view of all of the
sciences.

A unity is required in all the sciences, for "the one ... is the beginning

of the knowable regarding each class," even though the one is not the same in every
class (1016b20). Every science also shares certain rational needs. "[I]n general
every science which is ratiocinative or at all involves reasoning deals with causes and
principles, more or less precise" (1025b5). While these sciences admit of regional
limits, they do have similar requirements and goals, and the same sorts of theoretical
investigation are involved in the universal science of first philosophy, but without the
regional limits. Moreover, Aristotle subverts the finality of the limitation of each
science to a specific genus by arguing that genera are, to a certain extent, hypothetical
constructions. Any given thing, examined in different ways, may be assigned to any
number of genera. Hence, certain interconnections are thought to exceed the limits of
genera, grounding the possibility of a science of being qua being (Leszl, 80), and this
implies that a certain unity pervades all of being. Insofar as the sciences all require

24
such an identity in their respective fields, the existence of this unity--in addition to the
common rationality of the various fields--grounds the possibility of a universal
conception of science. For these reasons, Novak can speak with some justification of
"the Aristotelian scientific enterprise" (Novak, 192). This is apparent also from his
critical examination of the limits of science. Aristotle's negative treatment of science

in general manifests the univocity of the general aspects of the various sciences, as in
his argument "that there can be no scientific treatment of" the accidental (1026b4).
Though he confirms this 'empirically' by pointing to the 'fact' that no science-whether practical, productive or theoretical--deals with the accidental (1026b5), he
also does so by rational argument--by examining the 'nature' of the accidental in
general (1026b21--"this is clear also from arguments such as the following ... ")-and both rational and empirical approaches arrive at the same general view of science,
a view that describes its generic methods and its generic limitations. The standard
objection--that Aristotle is an empiricist--is invalid. Elements of both empiricism and
rationalism are present in Aristotle's account. Indeed, Lewes goes to the extreme of
arguing that "[i]t is clear that [Aristotle's] conception of proof is one which inevitably
tends to make investigation metaphysical and a priori" (Lewes, 116). This is
overkill, but certainly strands of rationalism, and of a general view of the sciences
that overreaches the regional limits of the sciences, are present in Aristotle. Thus,
the need that science take the entire universe within its purview, and the permeability
of the generic limits of regional sciences, when coupled with the similarity of
Aristotle's views on the goals and grounds of the various sciences and the frequency
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of his abstract discussions of science, which seem unattached to any specific science,
suggest that these regional and changeable limits should not be applied to the concept
of science itself, whether it has arisen through an empirical analysis or an a priori
construction.
The order and unity required for science must also be necessary, and, in a
sense, eternal--there must be a unity that extends through time. Hence, Aristotle
argues that the primary conditions are necessarily the case, since "the object of
scientific knowledge is of necessity," and so scientific knowledge is also "eternal, for
things that are of necessity in the unqualified sense are all eternal and things that are
eternal are ungenerated and imperishable" (Nie.Ethics, 1139b22-24). Knowledge is of
the unchanging, determinate essence, and this seems to rule out the possibility of a
science of matter, potential and the accidental, for Aristotle regards these as
indeterminate and unknowable. But they are necessary objects of any scientific
inquiry--if indirectly--for they concern the source of change, differentiation and
identity, and so Aristotle gives knowledge a more extended sense. In examining that
which is, science has to examine matter and potential as well, and these must also
admit of ordered explanation as if they were determinate and unchanging in their
modes of relation. The possibility of this science of potential, which shall be
examined later, is hinted at in Aristotle's equivocation on the idea of necessity.
Aristotle distinguishes scientific knowledge, which is of the eternal, from artistic
knowledge and practical wisdom, whose objects are not of necessity, but this does not
mean that the latter two are any less eternal. Art, for Aristotle, differs from science
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in that it is concerned not with the things that come into being by necessity or by
nature, but with the "state of capacity to make, involving a true course of reasoning"
(1140a9). But this means that art, like science, concerns a rational order. Chance and
art are involved with the same objects, and yet art is not unlimited or disordered, as
chance is supposed to be, for it concerns the one and only true course of reasoning; in
other words, it follows a universal order, even though it is concerned "with the
variable" (1140a23). This is contrasted with "lack of art," which is also concerned
with the variable, but which constitutes "a false course of reasoning" (l 140a22). The
measure of reason is essentially present in natural and artificial objects. Hence, that
which is and that which is made are alike rational and necessary, and both can
therefore be the objects of scientific knowledge.
To have scientific knowledge, then, requires that the essences of things be
protected from change, or at least indeterminacy. Aristotle does this by limiting
indeterminacy and otherness, and gradually removing their essential, radical
characteristics until they are defined and included within his system. They are said in
many senses, but these are limited, for if "one were to say that [a] word has an
infinite number of meanings, obviously reasoning would be impossible"
(Metaph. 1006b5). The number of meanings is limited and each of the usable senses

allows for order. By introducing "difference into the identity of the concept,"
Aristotle includes indeterminacy within his system only to subordinate it "to identity
or to the Same" (Difference and Repetition, Deleuze, xv). To deal with such topics
as would suggest indefinability--i. e. , matter, potentiality, the accidental, monstrosity
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and the infinite--Aristotle defines them in ways that show their essential unity and
regularity. As a result, they fit entirely within his ordered classification of the
universe. "[T]he determination of the concept of difference is confused with the
inscription of difference in the identity of an undetermined concept," and
consequently, "[d]ifference then can be no more than a predicate in the
comprehension of a concept" (Deleuze, 32). Difference is systematized. However,
in so doing, Aristotle's system is sheared of the indeterminacy and otherness that
allow him to be considered a pluralist. Aristotle's will to the totality of scientific
reason overcomes his understanding of what makes change possible, and hence one is
left with the image of him as a monist in pluralist's clothing, excluding radical
otherness and imagining a unified rational order underlying all being. The notion that
Aristotle allows for any indeterminacy and otherness at all is indeed dubious as he
keeps them entirely from the formal region of essences while explaining away the
putatively indeterminate. Order increasingly shows its presence in all aspects of his
system (cf. Meta.984bl4).
To overcome the problem raised by Heraclitus and Parmenides, Aristotle uses
the terms 'indeterminacy' and 'otherness' in several senses, but always with an eye to
limiting their scope. Indeterminacy and otherness present such a difficult problem for
Heraclitus and Parmenides because they seem ungraspable, indefinable--ever external
to the limits of discourse. Aristotle's use of them, however, is predicated on their
limitation, and thus, a provisional definition is possible. This attempt at a definition
is, of course, a begging of the question in that "it is not possible to define anything
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[at all] ; for definition is . . . of the form" ( 1036a28-9). Indeterminacy and otherness,
properly understood--that is, in a radical sense--have no forms, no unity and nothing
which allows for linguistic inclusion or definition. Because they lack unity and
universality, they are unknowable, "[f]or all things that we come to know, we come
to know in so far as they have some unity and identity, and in so far as some attribute
belongs to them universally" (999a27-28). Indeterminacy and otherness, taken
radically, have no unity and order, and nothing to even merit a name at all. The
mental constructs to which they are thought to refer--apeiron, hyle, tyche, etc.--taken
radically, have only the determinacy that arises from their being formulated as terms
of discourse. The possibility of a 'subject' in discourse--as the reference point of a
term--is grounded on a certain determinacy, for the term is translated from the Greek
'hypokeimenon ', meaning 'substrate', a word hardly suitable for 'things' that are

formless and without essential, perduring unity. Terms presuppose limitations and
oneness--the unity and oppositional identity of the thing--and for this reason, language
inevitably involves itself in contradictions in the attempt to bring such indeterminate
'things' to the level of discourse. Hence, one understands Parmenides' studied
avoidance of nouns and his argument that names fail to capture the essence of things.
Coming to be and perishing, for Parmenides, "are just names which mortals have laid
down believing them to be true" (frag.8, quoted in K. Taylor, 16). The being of the
ever-changing, as Parmenides recognizes, cannot be captured by the determinate
requirements of names, because some essential stability is necessary for something to
be called a thing, and this cannot be said of the indeterminate or the radical other.
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However, this being said, the self-contradictory use of the terms is quite in keeping
with the requirements of discourse, i.e., that concepts refer to some formed thing that
is, whether as idea or object. A subject of discourse must be a thing in particular,

"for it is impossible to think of anything if we do not think of one thing"
(Meta.1006b10). It must also be ordered to the point of unity, for definition requires a

unity: "it must be a formula of some one thing" (1037b27). Hence, definition requires
an order, a form and a unity, none of which can be predicated of radical
indeterminacy and otherness. They, then, seem unsuited for definition, and as a result
each is normally defined indirectly, by negation or analogy.
The indeterminate, as unbounded and exceeding the limits of all causal
sequentiality, has no determinate shape and is insusceptible of causal explanation
(aitia, causes or explanations). It has no ends or limits. This is crucial, because, for

Aristotle, the limit determines what a thing is. A limit is "the last point of each
thing," or "the first point beyond which it is not possible to find any part," and
something without limits, then, has no end, and thus no particular shape, form or
essence (1022a4). To limit something is to go outside it, determining its nature by
opposition to that which (it) is not. But for the universe, this is impossible, for
nothing is external to the universe. Hence, Aristotle defines the universe as a whole
from within, as if the borders could be determined even where there is no outside.
But even this is contingent on the existence of a strict limit between being and
absolute non-being. This shows the radical character of the presence/non-presence of
an absolutely unqualified indeterminacy, for the 'presence' of any indeterminacy
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undermines all oppositionality in overrunning all borders. If the border were itself in
question, at any point within the universe, none of the borders could be established,
for they are mutually dependent. That which is indeterminate cannot properly be
distinguished from that which is not, because that distinction would allow one to
assign limits to the 'thing'. Hence, the indeterminate, like the Derridean conception
of life-death, overflows all borders, and abolishes the possibility of limits and an
analytic oppositional identity.
This is especially clear in the case of science. The presence of any true
indeterminacy subverts the entire network of connections in the scientific system, for,
being unlimited, it cannot be confined to any localized area within or outside the
system (and there is no outside to a system that must concern the entire universe).
Aristotle's conception of the continuity of coming-to-be and passing away, in de
Generatione et Corruptione, appears, at first glance, to imagine this same overflowing

of limit, insofar as it rejects the conception of a rigid discontinuous border or limit
between coming-to-be and passing away (336b25), and imagines an infinite, eternal
return via a periodic cycle of the coming-to-be of the absolutely necessary, in which
that which follows determines that which precedes as much as that which precedes
determines that which follows (338a4-15). But the limits lie elsewhere, not in the
continuous matter--which, as we will see, admits of its own order and determinacy.
The underlying continuity of life, death and dying obscures the consecutiveness--the
differentiatedness--of the event and the limits applied by the four causes. "Wherever
there is continuity in any process ... we observe 'consecutiveness', i.e. this coming-
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to-be after that without any interval" (337a34ff.). The continuity of the substratum
and of change does not overcome all limits, insofar as change constantly sets up a
differentiation, and thus, a limit, between this that precedes and that that follows.
There will always be "a sequence of occurrences," in which one thing precedes and
conditions the appearance of the other, which is delimited, if only logically (as in the
formal distinction), from the first; it is a "determinate this" (337b26ff.). Occurrences
are ordered--limited--in terms of the four causes, and so the continuity of life-death
will not mean that there is not an essential order and "subordination" of subsequent
appearances on more originary conditions, though the Aristotelian system of the
eternal circularity of the absolutely necessary and the mutual implication of its events
suggests the arbitrariness of the causal limit, for the continuity and circularity of the
system make it unclear whether the antecedent event conditions the consequent or
whether the consequent conditions the antecedent or even whether there is really a
distinction between the two (337a22). But even in the case of the eternal recurrence
of the same--as in (infinite) periodic systems--this change will be determined by an
underlying substratum, which is distinct in different substances, and this character
limits and constrains that which occurs. The eternal recurrence of strictly necessary
change in the eternal or absolutely necessary substances "is determined by the
character of that which undergoes it" (338b15). Thus, Aristotle is concerned to
establish the presence of the limit even within the realm of the continuous, because he
recognizes that events must be determinate if there is to be science. Science depends
on the order of limits, on the sequentiality of causes (meaning within each type of
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cause) and the defined, limited rational forms. The importance of the limit in the
ascription of identity and order is obvious from the Greek stress on 'horismos'. The
Greek term 'horismos', like the Latin cognate 'definition', implies that limits are a
necessity for there to be a term (terminus--end, limit) at all. A thing cannot be
grasped unless it has a definite limit, a point beyond which it does not extend.
Indeterminacy is, then, an infinite (unbounded) and ambiguous concept, and it also
has no order, for order requires determinacy, a measured situating of parts, in their
oppositions, with relation to the whole. A thing without order (if it is not a simplicity)
cannot be said to be a unity or to be composed of unities. Unity, however, is said of
all being, and hence indeterminacy seems to involve either a class of unordered being
(chaos) or non-being. But Aristotle denies that indeterminacy is of this radical
character, and he is able to define it and include it within his ordered system, because
he draws significant limits to its application. It is in each case said with respect to a
kind of being (in potential, accidentia and the accidental).
For Aristotle, indeterminacy is said with respect to an absence of act or to an
inability to completely explain an event or a kind of being. It is said of potential and
matter and of much of the sensible world, for in this "is largely present the nature of
the indeterminate" (1010a3). And by arguing that 'that which is' for Heraclitus "was
identical with the sensible world" (1010a2), Aristotle makes a preliminary move to
exclude indeterminacy, change and otherness from the realm of knowledge, from the
formally distinct realm of the universals. But, as we shall see, he is unwilling to
allow the continuance of unrestrained indeterminacy in any sphere. Aristotle's
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expressions of indeterminacy are limited and can be said to be a privation of a
determinate cause or form. The senses of determinacy, then, help to elucidate the
meaning of indeterminacy. Determinacy, for Aristotle, requires a scientific
explanation of an event in terms of the totality of the ordered series of (proximate)
causes by which it comes about. Determining something means, most generically,
dividing it off from that which is other, giving it an identity, and, more specifically,
with regard to scientific objects, finding its material, formal, efficient and final
causes. The absence of the final cause alone is sufficient to leave something
indeterminate, for "[m]en do not think they know a thing until they have grasped the
'why' of it (which is to grasp its primary cause)" (Phys.l94b20). A thing is not
known until the final cause is known. Still, a determinate account requires all four
causes--not only the final, but also the material, formal, and efficient. "[T]he causes
being four, it is the business of the physicist to know about them all" ( 198a23). The
task of "natural philosophy" is to "take account of each of the four causes and refer
to them all in its explanation of events" (Ross, 78). Reason demands totality, though
not a Hegelian totality--merely a totality of the proximate series of causes involved
directly in an event. The determination of a thing requires the totality of the causes by
which it comes about, for "knowledge requires a totality of the known" (Aristotle's
Theory of the Infinite, Edel, p.86). All of the causes of an event must be knowable

for it to be determinate. But there are other senses of determinacy. To determine an
object is to find its causes, but also its limits and its essence (which is conceived as
the formal and final causes), for an object is not known as a unity and as that
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particular object which it is without the knowledge of its essence and limits, in
contradistinction to that which is other. Hence, Aristotle says that "there is knowledge
of each thing only when we know its essence" (Meta.1031b7). The essence is the
aspect of an object that can be determined regardless of the constant alteration of
things in the world, and even as a thing acquires a new essence, in substantial change,
this essence, as a universal, rational formality, remains the same, as long as it is in
the mind and can be predicated of other individuals. This is the first or final cause
(which, as we shall see is reduced to the first in nature), and knowledge of this first
cause is necessary for knowledge of a thing. "[W]e say we know each thing only
when we think we recognize its first cause" (983a25). The first cause is also
identifiable with the essence or substance of a thing. Aristotle calls the first cause
"the substance, i.e. the essence (for the 'why' is reducible finally to the definition,
and the ultimate 'why' is a cause and principle)" (983a27). The essence, or first
cause, then, is the unity in a thing which remains while the accidents change, and
indeterminacy is barred from this realm; the essence retains a unity because it is
unchanging and therefore is not indeterminate. But it should be remembered that
essence, in the sense of the first cause, is a kind of formal universality that does not
exclude the possibility of substantial change, as in generation and corruption.
Essence, seen as that which a thing is, does change, in the sense that a new formula
comes to describe the nature of the thing, but in this act the old formula does not
change; it simply ceases to describe the thing, though it may continue to describe the
essence of other things of the type. When one human being dies, the essence of
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human beings remains 'rational animal', for the essence, or rational formula, as a
definition, remains the same, present in the mind and predicated of other things.
The point is that Aristotle sets limits to the sphere of change, and, hence, to
the sphere of otherness and indeterminacy, by excluding change from a universal
realm, and by this move he secures a place for knowledge. Aristotle's distinction
between essential and accidental attributes, "the distinction between those attributes or
things true of objects that need not be true of them in order for them to endure or
persist and those attributes or things true of objects that must remain true of them as
long as they can be said truly to exist" (Taylor, iii), allows him to go beyond his
earlier delimitation of the radical character of otherness and indeterminacy and to
relegate their newly denatured and harmless character to the realm of the inessential.
The essence, as distinguished from the accidental, is determinate, known and
unchanging, and since this changelessness is a necessary condition for its being
grasped or comprehended, this distinction between the essential and the inessential
grounds the boundaries of science by situating indeterminacy and otherness within an
inessential, non-threatening domain of being, allowing both to be co-opted for the
purposes of guaranteeing the rigidity of the limit between secure essence and
changeable non-essence. And yet, Aristotle is unwilling to exclude science, as the
totalizing knowledge of change, from this sphere of non-essence. Because essence,
understood as that which a thing is, is also changeable, no unity remains in the thing
itself throughout all change--the essential formula does not change but it is no longer
ascribable to the thing in generation and corruption--and so Aristotle further
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guarantees the separation between the unity underlying all change and the otherness of
change by extending a final unity to the prime material substratum, as that which
underlies substantial change. But since Aristotle considers matter to be the most
proper realm of indeterminacy and otherness, this understanding forces him to tum
back from his previous conception of the indeterminacy of matter and to extend the
determinacy and order of being to matter and potential, the realm of the putatively
indeterminate--which, in short, becomes the most proper realm for science. Hence,
the securing of the borders of science necessarily overflows its own limits. Its selfaggrandizing, totalizing logic can end only by denying the possibility of any sphere of
indeterminacy remaining other to, and therefore threatening, its provenance.
Determinacy must, then, be applicable to change, and not only to the strict necessity
operative in the changes of eternal bodies. This is clear from Aristotle's
understanding of determinacy. Determinacy requires a form and a regularity in
change; change must occur in an ordered fashion. The causes and effects of a given
event must be knowable. That which is determinate must have a particular
form--there must be a subject to which one refers in asserting x. But without
continuity in time, knowledge of a subject is impossible. "[l]n pursuing the truth one
must start from the things that are always in the same state and suffer no change" in
time, such as the heavenly bodies (Meta.1063a13). Science, using the notion of
hypothetical necessity--of a necessary order coming into play in the presence of any
given situation--extends this notion, however, to the realm of the biological and the
contingent. But the tendency is toward a continuity in time, and this idea of a
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continuity in time requires the positing of essence and a material substratum. As Kant
argues, a material substratum is necessary for the mere perception of time through
continuity. "All determination of time presupposes something permanent in
perception. . . . [P]erception of this permanent is possible only through a thing outside
me" (Critique of Pure Reason, B275). Without a permanent external thing there is no
basis for perception, for perception is in time and the permanent allows one to grasp
things with respect to their continuity or sameness. The continuity of things in time is
essential for Aristotle, in that the loss of this continuity would destroy the ordered
regularity of motion and change on which science is built. It would introduce a
radical otherness, a passing into utter non-being. But Aristotle sets up a rigid
separation between being and non-being, like the posited magnetic domains of the
inflation theory of physicists, in which non-being (absolute non-being, not death) does
not even stand as a limit, for the whole of being is absolutely limited from within,
and continuity is never violated within the sphere of being. Aristotle's temporal
continuity is expressed in the material substratum of a thing. Things continually in
flux lack this temporal continuity and hence admit of no explanation. Consequently, in
the Heraclitean view, the subject of a statement is not a clear referent, for the thing to
which a subject refers can never be pinned down in its true oppositional nature over
time. If we work on the assumption that things in the world change, science becomes
impossible, unless we posit a substratum that remains the same while the accidentia,
or even the substantia, change, for without a continuity in change, there would be a
disruption in the ordered series of causes and a generation from absolute non-being.
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But, by assuming a material substratum, the understanding of change as continuous
(de Gen. et Corr. 336a15) and yet ordered is grounded. The assumption of a material

substratum underlying change abolishes the conception of change as radical otherness,
and so clears the way for determinacy, and so, in some ways, the putatively
indeterminate matter becomes the determinate par excellence.
This use of a material substratum is inherently a move against unqualified
otherness, for it requires that Aristotle presuppose an essential unity of objects in
time. He uses Parmenides' definition of change--to become other--but limits its scope
to that which is predicated of the substratum. Things do not become other without a
unity in a substratum. In change, they do not become other in all respects, for in the
process they do not pass through unqualified otherness--i.e. non-being. A unity is
retained, even in substantial change, where the substratum of prime matter remains.
There is no change in prime matter; there is change only of that which it underlies.
This explanation of change denies essential otherness. In change there is no otherness
in the matter (the substratum) of a thing. For all change, including substantial change,
or generation and destruction, "something must have existed as a primary substratum
from which it should come and which should persist in it" if it is destroyed, and this
is matter (Phys.192a28). As the unity underlying all change, matter (in the strict
sense, as potentiality) "is necessarily outside the sphere of becoming and ceasing to
be" (192a27). It is changeless and eternal--not only not indeterminate but the
foundation of all determinacy. As Ross argues, "matter in the most proper sense is
the substratum involved in substantial change," though matter is also said of the
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substrata underlying locomotion, alteration and change of size (Ross, 102). By
positing a material cause, Aristotle explicitly rejects the idea that things are generated
ex nihilo or destroyed utterly. Matter is said in several senses, but "in the most

proper sense [it] is to be identified with the substratum which is receptive of
coming-to-be and passing-away," although it is also said of the substratum of the
remaining kinds of change--that between contrarieties (de Gen. 320a3-5). The material
cause is the substratum that underlies a change. The prime matter persists; nothing
passes into unqualified non-being. Change is limited to the potentialities of that prime
matter. Though there is generation and destruction, nothing comes to be from
nothing, or turns into nothing, in the unqualified sense. Generation occurs "when
nothing perceptible persists in its identity as a substratum, and the thing changes as a
whole (when e.g. the seed as a whole is converted into blood ... )" (319b15). In this
change nothing perceptible remains, but that is not to say that nothing remains, for
Aristotle does not equate perceptibility with reality (319a26). "[J]ust as people speak
of 'a passing-away' without qualification when a thing has passed into what is
imperceptible and what in that sense 'is not', so also they speak of 'a coming-to-be
out of a not-being' when a thing emerges from an imperceptible" (319a23). A unity
is retained throughout change, in the material substratum, even in generation and
destruction, for the distinction between generation/ destruction and alteration lies
merely between that which has an imperceptible substratum and that which has a
perceptible substratum (319b10-16). The material substratum does not become other
in change, for an otherness in the substratum would be a passing into non-being. But
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"every change is from something to something" (Phys. 224b35). Change is limited to
an otherness of that which prime matter underlies. This limitation of otherness is a
move against indeterminacy as well, for it denies that there is any passage into
absolute non-being in the course of change. That would imply a radical otherness--an
otherness to the most universal of determinations, being--and an abolition of the limit,
for the extension of a limit to non-being would imply the continuation of a relation
and a unity between being and absolute non-being. To allow such a passage would
mean the movement out of the ordered system of being, and so Aristotle denies that
there is change involving unqualified non-being. Aristotle's idea of a material
substratum allows him to maintain his conception of the order and unity underlying
change without dissolving change. Because it makes change compatible with
determinacy, the idea of the material substratum provides an answer to Heraclitus and
a partial answer to Parmenides, in that it rules out the idea of change as a passing into
non-being.
And yet change would be impossible if there were no indeterminacy in the
system, if there were no potential for change. Aristotle's solution to Parmenides is to
introduce the notion of potential as an indeterminacy in the system that allows for
change. "Potentiality gives Aristotle a way to save both ex nihilo nihil fit and
substantial (existential) change. There need be no absolute non-being" (Preus, 50).
Potentiality allows for change without undermining the possibility of a real
substratum, but this solution is not without problems. The difficulties with this
solution are ontological and rational. The rational problem is that any indeterminacy
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in the system places the totality of explanation of the entire rational system in doubt.
The ontological problem is that any indeterminacy cannot be act, and hence
indeterminacy seems to imply chaos, a realm of ideas or forms, or non-being. I will
address the ontological problem first.
Aristotle's solution to this problem is well-known. He argues that the being of
act is not the only kind of being. "There are many senses in which a thing may be
said to 'be', but all that 'is' is related to one central point, one definite kind of thing,"
one physis (Meta. 1003a33-34). The idea that there are various senses of being allows
Aristotle to ascribe being, and hence, unity, to something formless and indeterminate.
This equivocation of being also allows him to remove the locus of indeterminacy from
form--to safeguard the totality of his rational system--and to permit the existence of a
potential for change. The solution involves an otherness in being that, nonetheless,
retains a unity. Though it is without form, potency is, nonetheless, a kind of being.
Potency is other in being to the actual, but it is still one of the senses of being, and
therefore it retains a unity. This alternate sense of being is said to be indeterminate,
for indeterminacy is said of being that is not actual, for all that is actual has a form,
and, hence, limits. If there were only one category of being, then there could be no
indeterminacy within Aristotle's world system, for the indeterminate would either be
the nature of things and would thus have form, or it would be nonexistent and not a
subject of discourse. If it had form, then there would be no potential for change.
There would only be the actual. If it were non-existent there would be no knowledge
of it and it could not be said.
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But the indeterminate, in the sense of potential, matter, chance, monstrosity
and the infinite, is a special kind of otherness. Because being is said in many senses,
it is possible to have something that is other to form, but not to being. The
indeterminate retains a kind of being, and though it is not the same kind of being as
that of the actual, it retains a unity with the other kinds of being, for every sense of
being refers to one central point. The indeterminate for Aristotle is not an example of
an otherness beyond unity, for it has nothing to do with unqualified non-being. It still
has unity in that it refers to something that is in some sense. Unity is not something
that could be said of something wholly indeterminate or of non-being. But it is said
of Aristotle's notion of the indeterminate, insofar as potentiality, the accidental and
matter are beings, and all beings are possessed of a certain unity, and so Aristotle's
indeterminate is not other to unity. This unity is not merely linguistic; it is not merely
the unity that necessarily arises in the expression of a term--i.e., because a subject
must be referred to in the concept 'indeterminacy', the term must refer to something
that is and is one. Rather, this unity is expressed on the level of being, though this
idea is questionable with respect to chance events and the shifting boundaries of
matter. Aristotle conceives of matter and potential neither as linguistic categories,
nor as unqualified not-being, but as beings possessed of unity, in a certain sense. His
limitation of the radical character of indeterminacy and change, then, is not limited to
the necessary unity presupposed by raising something to the level of logos, for he
attributes a certain unity and constancy to change and 'indeterminate' beings.
Indeterminacy and change are made possible, on the level of being, by the
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Aristotelian equivocation. Their further limitation possibilizes science.
The science of being requires determinacy. Science is dependent on order, on
the rule-governed separation and combination of objects, and on the regularity of their
changes. If the equivocation of being via potential is to explain all change, then
potential must not be open to sheer indeterminacy. But sheer indeterminacy means
any indeterminacy in that anything unexplainable, like a miracle, or any change in

genus or essence will have no rational ground whatsoever. Reason cannot even begin
to comprehend such a thing for it seems to involve a move into or out of non-being.
Indeterminacy implies that an event does not have a rational ground at all, no matter
how far one goes back. Non-being is no sort of ground at all; it is an abyss of
ground. And science cannot have anything to say about this, "for scientific
knowledge involves apprehension of a rational ground" (Meta. l040b33). As a result,
indeterminacy brings into question the order of the system as a whole, because it
suggests that the order found is chimerical and rests on something other, which could
intervene and disrupt it at any moment. This explains Aristotle's (literal) fixation on
determining the place of otherness and indeterminacy and guaranteeing this
inductively for all future time. The changelessness of knowledge's objects and the
regularity of their change cannot be held hostage to an unrestrained otherness that
might disrupt their order at any time in the future.
In fear of such a situation, Aristotle banishes that sort of indeterminacy from
potential, and by this limitation of indeterminacy, he retains the possibility of science
and the totality of his system. Indeterminacy is permitted for one step back in a
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process, but it never goes farther than that. Beyond one step the string of rational
explanations supervenes, obviating the possibility of a Hegelian 'bad infinite'. An
accident, for example, "is not an accident of an accident ... [the series of accidents]
cannot form an infinite series . . . for no unity can be got out of such a sum

11

(1007b2-10). Unity is always retained in Aristotle's notion of the indeterminate. Sheer
indeterminacy has no unity whatsoever, and so it presents the danger of events
passing into nothingness or the meaninglessness of an infinite series. Aristotle limits it
out of a horror vacui, imagining the irrational string of events receding into the void.
If there were an infinite series and no final cause of a thing, then "there [would] be

[no] reason in the world (994b 14). Such an idea would "destroy science" (994b21).
11

Indeterminacy, then, must be controlled for there to be science. Science is an
investigation of potentiality, for there is no change in this world without a potential
for change, and so science requires that potential admit of some predictability, some
understandable cause of change. Without this proviso, science would be impossible,
for all science is either of that which is always or of that which is for the most part
11

.... The thing must be determined" as happening in this way (1027a20-22). The
potential that is in things must have a predictable nature. (This despite the fact that
nature (physis) has a dynamic sense.) Science requires an ordered potential; things
must happen always or for the most part, and in an orderly fashion. That this is
actually the case is proved by the manifest existence of sciences. Aristotle, in his
empiricist garb, looks to the world and sees that sciences actually exist, and so he
concludes, by a transcendental argument (if not by a thoroughly a priori stipulation),

45

that things do in fact happen in an orderly fashion, that potential is determinate.
Science is an investigation of potential and the material substratum, and thus
they must be a kind of ordered being if there is to be science, for science is ordered
knowledge of ordered being. Indeed, as Aristotle says, "[t]he underlying nature [the
material substratum] is an object of scientific knowledge, by an analogy" (191a8).
This is not a direct form of knowledge, but it allows the examination of the
supposedly indeterminate potential and matter. "Through analogy ... is the
absolutely undetermined matter of sensible things brought to our knowledge" (Owens,
59). This dependence on analogy exposes Aristotelian science to a deconstructionist
critique, as in Deleuze, who argues for "[t]he impossibility of reconciling univocity
and analogy" (Deleuze, vi). This is not without an anticipatory ground in Aristotle,
who argues that the necessity of analogical investigations of matter and potential is
caused by their indeterminacy. But Aristotle recognizes that the study of matter and
potential is crucial for science, and so rather than assuming that the paradigm of
science is necessarily indeterminate--that science, as Freud says in Beyond the
Pleasure Principle, can never reach the level of being because it is necessarily

metaphorical--he assumes that the need for analogy, and for the assumption of
unprovable first principles, does not disqualify the possibility of an ordered science.
The necessity of using analogy in examining matter and potential does not disallow
them from an essentially ordered 'movement'.
Scientific knowledge--which actually exists, according to Aristotle--is possible
only of things that happen always or for the most part, and since potential and the
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material substratum are objects of scientific knowledge by analogy to act, they must
be actualized in regular ways. The kind of change potential permits must also be
limited, for scientific knowledge excludes any change whose otherness exceeds all
limits and unity. An ordered system implies orders, kinds, genera and species. Things
that happen determinately must move in regular ways without stepping out of their
regular orders. Thus, a certain measure of determinacy must be said of the
supposedly indeterminate concepts of potentiality and matter. They are objects of
scientific knowledge by analogy, they are actualized in regular ways and they do not
involve change in species or genus, considered with respect to the particular change in
question. According to Aristotle, qualitative, non-substantial change--i.e. alteration-proceeds between contraries within a genus (Meta.1057a26-32). As such, alteration
retains a unity. Two things of the same genus have "that one identical thing which is
predicated of both and is differentiated in no merely accidental way, whether
conceived as matter or otherwise" (1057b37-1058al). The particular respect in which
things are identical is essential, and thus "to change from one genus to another genus
is not possible except in an incidental way, as from colour to figure" (1057a27).
Such a change would be material, a change from one sort of matter, with given
potentials to another, and this form of otherness implies a passage into non-being, for
it would require the destruction of the ultimate substratum prior to the generation of a
new thing. And yet, this account of change seems to privilege alteration. More
radical changes do occur, such as substantial changes, but even in these cases a unity
of the prime material substratum is retained; there is never a complete otherness in
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change. Change is to become other. But Aristotle's notions of otherness are as
restricted as his senses of indeterminacy.
Otherness is first and most basically the heterogeneity of being. There is
otherness if there is not a simplicity. A simplicity has no parts and all is one. If there
are parts then there are things that are other to the other parts and to the whole. Thus,
'"[o]ther or the same' can ... be predicated of everything with regard to everything
else--but only if the things are one and existent" (Meta.1054b18-19). But for
Aristotle, all that is is one, i.e. , every thing is a being, and every being is a unity in
itself. Hence, there is nothing that is itself other to the one, or to being, in an
unqualified sense. This applies even to Aristotle's view of otherness. Otherness is
not predicated of things that lack unity or are non-existent; it is predicated solely of
beings that are one, and that are related somehow, as other to something. The concept
of otherness, for Aristotle, as a linguistic term, requires that it have a subject, that the
term 'other' refer to something (i.e., something that is one, that is a whole)--to a
particular thing, something definite, and consequently to something that is--but this
determinacy is extended beyond linguistic requirements to the level of being. The
expression of otherness as denoting something non-existent is disallowed by Aristotle
because such a reference is unintelligible--it is to nothing. As he argues in On

Interpretation, an expression referring to something which is not is an indefinite
noun--it doesn't properly refer to anything at all (16a30). There must be a subject for
there to be things predicable of it, including non-existence. Unity and being are
necessary for a subject to exist. Thus, Aristotle rules out unqualified otherness; there
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is nothing that is other to being in an unqualified sense. All that is, or can be said, is
a being, and is one with other beings, qua being. There is nothing that is wholly
other. Change is to become other, but since unlimited, unqualified otherness is ruled
out, there must be a kind of limited otherness if there is to be change. And otherness
is necessary not only for there to be change, but also for the explanation of change.
In change, an aspect of something becomes other than it originally is. It does
so either by means of something other, in the sense of the external, or by something
in the same thing "qua other" (Meta.1019a15-16). A unity does not change by virtue
of itself, and there is nothing to which it can change if there is no otherness, and so
otherness is necessary if there is to be change. Being cannot be a Parmenidean unity
without otherness.

There must be a plurality, for change occurs via the other (the

efficient cause), into the other. All arts, for instance, "are originative sources of
change in another thing or in the artist himself considered as other" (1046bl). This is
the case in nature as well. Change in nature occurs internally, as well as externally,
for things in nature have an internal principle of motion (Phys.192bl4), but even this
internal change occurs via the other, a situation implied by Aristotle's concern to
prevent the interminable otherness of an infinite causal series by placing an unmoved
mover at the beginning, a deity that is one, self-present and moved by itself, not qua
other, or by an other. Thus, in Aristotle's examination of natural motion, he
determines that a thing which is said to be one may have parts, and it is by virtue of
the otherness of parts that it is able to change internally. The most basic sort of
otherness is the otherness of parts, which is necessary if everything is not to be a
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unity. Otherness of parts must also exist for a subject to have predicates. Internal
change happens via this sort of otherness--something makes a change in the thing qua
other. But this otherness is not complete, for a thing must still have a unity in some
sense for it to be called a thing. Otherness must be constrained by the limit, and unity
must underlie it, if there is to be knowledge. The essential unity of a thing is its
substance, and does not include its accidents, and therefore it is stable and definable
(1031a19). Substance can be divided into two kinds, the concrete thing--the formula
and the matter (not the prime substratum)--and the formula by itself, and only the first
can be generated and destroyed (1039b20), but in either case something unified is
retained throughout all change--the formula predicated of the thing and the prime
matter. The prime matter, as the basic substratum of all change, can never change,
and neither can the formula, even if the formula is no longer true of the thing
(Cat.4a37-4b2), that is, if it may no longer be predicated, for example, of a desk that
has been changed into a chair, for "there is nothing that can alter the nature of
statements and opinions" (4b 10). But the unity of a thing can also be considered as
the thing, plus its differentiae and accidents, and this conception of the thing
precludes definition, for the accidents are always changing. However, in change,
there is no complete otherness with respect to all unity, that is, no otherness in
formula or prime matter.
The second kind of otherness is in concrete form. Things that have a unity in
an essential respect, such as members of a species, are other in this sense. But they
remain related by the unity of species. "The concrete thing is other, but not other in
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species, because in the definition there is no contrariety" (Meta.1058b7-8). In things
which are other in species, there is a contrariety in the definition. This does not,
however, imply that there is no unity in the respect in which the things differ--for if
they differ in their type of animality, they are both animals. This unity is necessary
for two things to be related at all.
Otherness in species does not abrogate this sort of unity. Things which are
other in species are identical in some essential respect, and this is their genus
(1054b30). Otherness in species involves a similarity in some essential respect--such
as animality. Things with no common aspect, but which are still possessed of unity
and being, may be said to be other in genus. Things other in genus are beyond
complete difference, for difference [note that Aristotle also refers to a difference
between genera, but only rarely] requires a comparison. To use an imperfect analogy,
things which are other in genus are like apples and oranges; there is no way to
compare them on equal terms; "things which differ in genus have no way to another,
but are too far distant and are not comparable" (1055a7). A more proper analogy to
otherness in genus would be a comparison of a human to a stone. They differ in all
aspects except that each is a substance, and substance is not some quality by which
things may be compared. There is no means to compare them, for their "proximate
substratum is different, and [they] are not analysed the one into the other nor both
into the same thing (e.g. form and matter ... )" (1024bl0-13). They cannot be
reduced analytically to any sort of unity beyond that of the merely formal description
of each as substance. This sort of otherness is beyond complete difference (1055a7).
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For Aristotle, it seems as if there is no otherness beyond this sort (1054bl8).
Unqualified otherness is not a part of Aristotle's system, for such an otherness
implies the absence of a unity. Even otherness in genus--that of a stone to a human,
for example--retains a unity in that both can be said to be substance. They are not
other to being, to the one. Unqualified otherness to the one would not be to the many,
for the many is composed of the one. Instead, it would be to that which has no unity
at all. If substance is predicated of all the things that are, then the otherness beyond
otherness in genus would be to non-being, chaos or a kind of non-being, such as
potentiality. Hence, the notion of otherness, while necessary for there to be order in
being, nonetheless calls into question the possibility of oneness. If everything were
other to everything else, in the sense of having no common aspect, then there would
be no means of comparing them; there would be no measure, no order or logos. The
one could not be "the measure of all things, " for it would not be in all things
(Meta. l053al8). If the other were without unity, then it would be impossible to even

refer to it, for 'it' would no longer be one thing, and "[t]o speak of 'something' is to
speak of 'some one thing'" according to Plato's Sophist (Sophist, 237). This other to
unity could not even be spoken.
Otherness in the senses discussed by Aristotle does not have this problem,
however. Things which are other in species are one in the respect in which they
differ. Things which are other in genus are not one in that sense. But as referents in
discourse they are one in the sense that they both have unity and substance and are
possible subjects of logos. Aristotle's other is used in any of these limited senses, for
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it does not involve a change away from substance (to or from non-being) or from
genus or even species. As such it does not involve otherness in the material
substratum or complete otherness. The principle of difference involves the retention of
a unity in some respect. Unqualified otherness, a difference without similarity, is
between things to which no common predicate may be assigned, or even between
something real and something of which nothing could be predicated. The unqualified
other is that which does not have any sort of unity with a given subject. This form of
otherness may be defined negatively only, in terms of the genus within which one
exists and speaks. To be consistent, one must regard it as outside of one's discourse.
But Aristotle's 'other' is limited. It is included within the system and not passed over
in silence, because its lurking absence would call into question the entire attempt to
establish a science of ordered being, a science of the central point to which all that
exists refers. The science of being must surround itself with the rational and the
known in order to exclude that outside it which would destroy its regularity. Thus,
Aristotle says that the source of change--potential (Meta.1019b36)--is a kind of being,
and limits indeterminacy by placing it within ordered potential.

CHAPTER TWO--POTENTIAL AND MATTER
Potential would seem prima facie to be a case of indeterminacy. Aristotle
conceived it originally as a way of bringing an indeterminacy into the world that is
not non-being, but that allows for regular change, without obviating the unity of a
substratum. For Aristotle, change occurs always with respect to something constant,
to a realm of being that is not changing. His equivocation of being makes this
possible. If all being were act, then nothing could happen. But if, on the other hand,
all being were merely potency, then no potency could be actualized. Hence,
Aristotle's separation between act and potency, between definite being and indefinite
potential, is necessary if there is to be ordered change, change that does not transcend
all unity. An essential aspect of this location of indeterminacy in potential, and not in
form, is that it preserves for Aristotle the possibility of determinacy in act. Act, or
form, is freed of any destabilizing indeterminacy by the equivocation of being, by the
separation of being into act and potency. But while Aristotle calls potential
indeterminate, he limits the extent of its indeterminacy in order to retain the viability
of the sciences of being and nature. Science requires that there be an order in change,
but this order would be lost and an explanation of change would be impossible, if
unrestrained indeterminacy were said of all (things), and if potential were
indeterminate to the extent that it did not admit of any essential order. Aristotle
understands the radical character of the challenge. Likening Anaxagoras' famous
53
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remark, purged of its self-contradictory formulation ('all things were mixed in all'
implies that things were in fact separable as such, whereas 'all was mixed in all' does
not), to the views of the 'modems', he recognizes that it denies all knowledge, for
"nothing could be truly asserted" of such an indeterminate being in which "nothing
was separated out" (Meta.989b6).

Order must be present in nature if there is to be

knowledge, and so he is concerned to prove that nature does in fact have an order
which prevents unlimited change. "[N]ature does not allow any chance thing to be
mixed with any chance thing" (989b 1). This includes the mixture of all in all, for
such an Anaxagorean ontology would exclude the limit and, with this, all predication.
A limited kind of indeterminacy is, then, said of a qualified kind of non-being
(potential) and of the inessential (the accidental), thus clearing a place for determinacy
and knowledge of the things in the world. This paradoxical step follows from the
logic of the system. Potential must be limited in nature and extent and yet
indeterminate for it to constitute an alternative to chaos, non-being and act.
Indeterminacy is found in potentiality, because potential is a kind of qualified
non-being. "[l]t is that which exists potentially and not in complete reality that is
indeterminate" ( 1007b28). It is indeterminate because it is not something in particular
with limits; it does not have form, and "[b]y form I mean the essence of each thing
and its primary substance" (1032bl). Potential is not a 'this' or a 'such'. It is not
therefore defined by limits. It is not actual, and for this reason the Sophists call it
non-being. Only a being that is actual can be determinate in the full sense. Potential is
indeterminate in these senses, and this sort of indeterminacy is a necessary condition

55
for it to play its role as that which makes change possible. But Aristotle, desiring that
his system be total, demonstrates that, in a way, potential is determinate. He
gradually reduces the scope of the indeterminacy of potential and matter until one
begins to wonder whether there is any indeterminacy at all. The indeterminacy of
potential is inextricably linked to the indeterminacy of matter, and so, in discussing
the indeterminacy of potential in change, I have found it necessary to discuss first the
indeterminacy of matter and its connections to potentiality.
The locus of indeterminacy is not arbitrary or indeterminable, for it is in
potential, and potential is in matter. Potential and matter are linked, in that potential
is a feature of the material substratum and, like prime matter, it cannot be said of a
'this'. Although it is something real (in a sense), matter "is [also] indefinite"
(Meta.1037a28). Thus, Aristotle likens prime matter to the apeiron, conceiving the

former as "matter absolutely unqualified, which is nowhere found in nature and
intrinsically unknowable," a privation of form and qua se "everlasting and
indestructible" (Seligman, 29). Potential, like matter, is a kind of indeterminate
being, and yet unchanging and eternal qua se. Potential and prime matter are not
things to which one can point, but this does not mean that they are (unqualified)
non-being. If they were, then there would be creation ex nihilo and discontinuity in
nature. Rather, matter is in things--is, in a sense, the things--and potential is in
matter, and each is said to refer to being. Potential and matter are indeterminate in
the sense that they do not have actual form. They are other to the actual, with respect
to form (as theoretical constructs--insofar as they can be examined in many ways--
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they have no actual form; but they do have a certain determinacy with respect to their
possible effects in any given case) and kind of existence. But matter and potential are
not that alien and indeterminate, for matter is what things are made of, and potential
is in things. The matter "is nearly, in a sense is, substance" (Phys. l92a5). Thus,
potential and matter are not unqualified non-being, and they also should not be
thought to exist in some realm of ideas. For Aristotle, a distinction in being does not
necessarily imply a realm of ideas existing separately from individuals. His assertion,
then, of potential as a kind of being that is 'in' existing things is his response to the
Platonic 'error' of ideal forms. If potential and matter are indeterminate, they are, at
least, not indeterminate with respect to being, and Aristotle limits their indeterminacy
even further in order to maintain the possibility of science.
Matter and potentiality are determinate in several senses, among the most
important of which is their well-defined use as theoretical constructs, with clear
referents, in explaining change. Because science is unable to directly apprehend
matter, it uses it analogically, instead, as the unity underlying change. Matter "is a
functional term for whatever it is that endures through a change in the capacity of
substratum" (Code, p.85). This always admits of a certain equivocation. Matter
"comes to be and ceases to be in one sense, while in another it does not" (Phys.
192a25). Prime matter is indeterminate in that it is not a 'this' --one cannot point to
it--and yet as a kind of construct, it is determinate. Matter is determinate with respect
to a given form, but any one thing can be looked at, from different perspectives, as
providing the matter for many different kinds of objects. However, in each case the
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potential of matter is determinate with respect to its particular context, for it is in
each case tied to a given form. Hence, Aristotle argues that matter "is a relative
term: to each form there corresponds a special matter" (194b9). In this sense, matter
appears to be more of a theoretical construct than anything else, for it depends on
how one examines something. The matter of a club might be the same matter as that
of a chair, looked at in another way. This fluidity implies its indeterminacy, for it
suggests that matter is infinite. But these are theoretical constructions--infinite
divisions of the same material. Matter can be conceived in any number of ways, no
matter how extended. Thus, Aristotle argues that the matter of man is not only man,
but the sun as well (194bl4). Moreover, changes in matter do not imply any
generation or destruction ex nihilo. An imperceptible material substratum remains
throughout all changes. Hence, when matter becomes form, there is no passing into
the radical otherness of unqualified non-being. A tree branch provides the matter for
a chair, and that chair provides the matter for fire, and throughout these changes a
certain primal substratum remains. There is said to be no matter in form, but this is
merely a way of looking at a thing. A chair qua wood is matter for fire. The matter is
the thing from which an object comes, but "a thing is not said to be that from which
it comes . . . [e.g.] the statue is not said to be wood but is said by a verbal change to
be wooden" (1033a17-18). Material is formless only in so far as it is a way of
looking at something as a potential for something else. Matter is a way of speaking,
a way of regarding x in its capacity for y, though this way of speaking remains
essentially tied, for Aristotle, to the physical possibilities of things. The sense in
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which matter is indeterminate recalls Aristotle's distinction between qualified and
unqualified non-being, and his insistence on the discussion of something in the
particular sense in which it is used, the qua distinction.
The limitations of the putatively indeterminate are most apparent in Aristotle's
explanation of the change of matter. The coming to be from matter is not from
unqualified non-being. Rather, "'to come to be so-and-so from not-being' means 'qua
not-being'" (Phys.191b9). A thing comes to be from not-being only in a certain
sense--looked at in one way. There is always a material cause, for "[o]nly things that
are said to be in the primary sense--substances--are said to come to be without
qualification" (Code, 85). All other things come to be from one thing to another. That
which comes to be without qualification is thought to come from non-being. But in all
change there is no passing into non-being without qualification. Non-substantial
change involves the alteration of things predicated of substance. The not-white
becomes white, for example. But nothing, that is to say, no prime matter, passes into
non-being in this move, or in any other change. The accidents, and even the essentia
change (in the sense of substantial change); the substrata remain the same. Something
not-white qua not-white changes into something white qua white and in this change
the thing said to be white changes determinately, with the retention of a unity, for it
occurs only with respect to color, but a unity is retained also in substantial change.
Determinacy is maintained in all change, for change cannot involve a passage
into unqualified non-being. In every change, according to Alan Code, "we may
distinguish three elements: the substratum, the form and the lack. The lack goes out
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of existence as a result of the change, while the form comes into existence" (85). The
substratum remains, as a unity, and a certain unity is retained in the determinate
change of the form and the lack as well. The lack is a privation, but the passing out
of existence of a privation is merely a way of speaking, for a privation is not a being.
And yet it is not non-being, in every sense. A privation is said to be in a thing, in
the sense that "in privation there is also employed an underlying nature of which the
privation is asserted" (Meta. l004al6). Aristotle argues that "the matter ... is
not-being only in virtue of an attribute which it has, while the privation in its own
nature is not-being" (Phys. l92a3). However, when a privation goes out of existence,
there is nothing that passes into unqualified non-being. The substratum does not
change at all, for although a thing comes to be from both its privation and its
substratum (matter), "it is said to come rather from its privation," because that is the
particular aspect which alters in a change (Meta. l033a8-ll). The matter does not
change, for "as potentiality it ... is necessarily outside the sphere of becoming and
ceasing to be" (Phys. l92a27). A particular aspect is changed--the privation. Thus, the
potential for change is with respect to a determinate quality of the thing. As Aristotle
says, "[p]rivation is a determinate incapacity" and thus change always occurs with
respect to a determinate aspect of a thing (Meta.l058b27). This rule is not abrogated
even in substantial change between genera. Alteration retains a unity because it
occurs between contrarieties, such as black and white, and this means that alteration
occurs according to a particular respect, a common characteristic--color--which
includes the contrarieties. But things that are other in genus
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no identity in any
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particular respect--they have no contrariety--and so they cannot change in genus.
Though Aristotle limits his discussion of change in book X of the Metaphysics to
change within genera, he admits elsewhere of changes with respect to no determinate
aspect of a thing, as in the substantive changes of generation and corruption, but even
there a unity is retained in the substratum of prime matter.
Change occurs according to a determinate respect. It occurs qua a particular
character of the agent, and the primary matter of the thing is unchanged. A doctor
becomes gray not qua doctor--for the substance of the doctor does not go into
non-being and change genera--but rather qua dark-haired (Phys.191b5). The change
avoids the substratum entirely and focuses on the particular accidental quality that is
to be changed. The accidental quality is determined as such by the way in which one
looks at the event. When a doctor builds a house, the incidental cause is said to be the
doctor. But he builds the house qua house-builder, and so the determination of an
incidental cause is purely theoretical and has nothing to do with the action itself. One
must attend to the particular perspective from which something is analyzed. 'Reality'
can be constructed in many possible ways, depending on one's purpose, and each will
still have some foundation in the nature of the thing. Something that can be
considered matter, if examined in one way, can be seen as form if considered from a
different perspective. A tree qua wood is matter; a tree qua tree is form. This does
not mean, however, that there will not be correct ways to look at given things, given
a certain set of circumstances. Like Plato in the Sophist, Aristotle demands that we
attend to the particular respect in which something is said (Owens, 55). "[O]ften the
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equivocal follows along unnoticed also in the definitions themselves. For this reason
the definitions also should be examined" (Top., 107b6-12, quoted in Owens, 55).
The goal is univocity, with respect to any given situation, and so one must examine
the ways in which given beings can be seen in terms of their matter and in terms of
their form. Aristotle considers the failure to make this sort of distinction the cardinal
error in previous philosophers' attempts to study the problem of change and non-being
(Phys .191b10-13). The use of theoretical constructs and universals predicated of the

things, but not present in them (present in the mind) (Cat. la20), allows change to
occur without any real passing into non-being. An essential material substratum is
protected, because only particular non-material characteristics are thought to change,
things that prime matter underlies. As a theoretical construct, matter does not have
any form, but it does have unity in time--as a permanent substratum--and being.
Matter, as one of the three 'elements' in change (form and privation being the
others), is necessary for any scientific examination of change, and so it cannot be
completely indeterminate. Matter is determined by analogy, by examination of what
results from it, and because these results are regular, matter is an object of scientific
knowledge by analogy. Indeed, it is the final object of the physicist, whose task is
"to state the form, definition, or end of whatever he is inquiring into, for from this its
matter can be deduced" (Ross, 79). Matter, and thus, potential, can be examined by
science. Hence, matter and its potential are not indeterminate in every sense.
The matter of something, as a theoretical construct, is an object of science. As
such it is indeterminate only in so far as it lacks form. If it were completely
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indeterminate, then there would be no scientific way to explain the regularity of
change. Its determinacy is more than just a linguistic requirement; science also
requires that there be some limits set to change. Matter changes because it has a
potential for change. For change to be determinate, potential must be determinate, and
since matter and potential cannot be examined directly, they are judged to be
determinate and predictable on the basis of their 'results', on the basis of the
regularity observed in change. In addition, potency is a kind of being, for Aristotle,
and so it has unity--for unity is said of all of the things that have being. And although
potency is said in many senses, "all" refer to one central point, "to the primary kind
of potency ... a source of change in another thing or in the same thing qua other"
(Meta.1019b36-1020a2). This source of change is determinate--it is a potency for
something in particular--and so potency is ordered being. And yet because potency
comes from matter and matter is not a 'this' it is thought to be indeterminate.
(Prime) Matter has the same status as potential. As the locus of potentiality, it
is called indeterminate because it exists potentially, and not actually--one cannot point
to it--but it is determinate in that it is a theoretical construct, a taking of something as
something. One can characterize the matter of a branch as the potential for kindling
or for a baseball bat or for a chair, and in each case the matter has a certain potential.
The potential is indeterminate in that it has no form. However, as we have seen,
potential is always a potential for something. The indeterminacy of potentiality must,
then, refer to the irregularity of its actualization. But the extent of this sort of
indeterminacy is gradually subverted by the requirements of science. This creates a

63

problem for Aristotle in that potentiality is his answer to Parmenides, and if
potentiality were determinate then there would no longer be a distinction between
matter and form; everything would be necessary and there would be no change.
Everything would be act. Being would be one. The problem can be traced to the
attempt at a scientific (systematic) treatment of being.
Because the notion of science, as ordered knowledge of ordered being, is
incompatible with an indeterminate object, it would appear that potential (as
indeterminate) is not a proper object of scientific knowledge. But in Aristotle's
account, order somehow finds its way into the notion of potentiality. Potencies must
be actualized in regular ways, since things happen always or for the most part--the
apparent exceptions being the accidental and the monstrous. And even "the corruption
and perversion of a thing does not tend to anything random but to the contrary or the
intermediate between it and the contrary. For out of the province one cannot go, since
error leads not to anything at random but to the contrary of truth, where there is a
contrary" (1227a31). This regularity is a requirement of science. Science is the
examination of the regular changes of being, which is to say, the examination of the
order of potential and matter. Any discussion of change requires an account of
potentiality, but without order potentiality could not be a matter for discourse, and
science would be impossible. Since potential, for Aristotle, is regular, that is,
ordered, and the exceptions are also a matter for science, science is possible. The
order in potential grounds this regularity of change, and so the regularity of change
can be ascribed to an order in the unseen potential. Potential is indeterminate in the
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sense that it lacks a form, but it is, nonetheless, ordered to certain ends.
Aristotle's discussion of potential takes the same ordered and determinate
approach as that of matter. In distancing himself from Plato's ideal forms, Aristotle
continually turns the discussion to the particular, the determinate, and thus his
discussion of potentiality takes the same

determinat~

and regular form. Potential is

always a potential for something in particular. As Aristotle argues in book IX of the
Metaphysics, "that which is 'capable' is capable of something and at some time and in

some way . . . and . . . some things can produce change according to a rational
formula and their potencies involve such a formula, while other things are
non-rational and their potencies are non-rational" (Meta.1047b35-1048a4). From this
remark it is clear that the science of change is possible, for things happen in very
regular ways, even the non-rational potencies mentioned above. If potential were
really as indeterminate as Aristotle claims elsewhere, then no science would be
possible. But, as we see, the effects of the four kinds of regular change, alteration,
locomotion, increase and diminution (leaving aside generation and destruction for the
moment), are determinate as well. Those things that produce change according to a
rational formula, like medicine, involve deliberation and "produce contrary effects,"
while those things that produce change according to a non-rational formula (the nonrational potencies, like heat) "are all productive of one effect each" (1048a8).
Potential, in so far as it lacks actuality, lacks form. It is indeterminate in this sense.
But it is actualized in such predictable ways that it is determinate enough to be
inquired into by science.
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The indeterminacy of potential seems, at first, to be limited to its lack of an
efficient cause. If potential is always a determinate potential for something, then it
seems odd that things do not always happen in the same way. Aristotle must be able
to account for this sort of change if the scientific explanation of the system is to be
total. One possible explanation is that it is not potential that is indeterminate, but
rather one's knowledge of the efficient cause that will effect the potential. The
absence of the efficient cause seems to explain why potential is not always actualized
in expected ways. Lacking a grand plan for all the actions in the universe, and having
extremely limited knowledge of the physical causes of actions, Aristotle is unable to
say for sure which efficient cause will effect a change or what telos is being served,
for it happens frequently that unexpected factors are involved in a change. Yet, this
does not undermine the determinacy of potential, for the effect of a specific efficient
cause is included within potential--it is a potential for something, and this something
depends on what the efficient cause is. The potential of water to become ice, for
example, cannot be actualized unless something lowers the temperature of the water.
If the efficient cause of a change in water is heat, then the potential of water for ice

will not be actualized, but another potential will be actualized, and in a determinate
and predictable fashion. Potential is sometimes actualized in strange ways, but only
when something interferes with its natural causes. That is to say, potential is
actualized in different ways when a different efficient cause supervenes. But when
something unexpected acts on something, the effect is, nonetheless, consonant with
the potential of the thing, given that circumstance, and this should be expected given
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Aristotle's concern elsewhere to understand the particular respect in which something
happens (Meta.1058b27). So, for example, "that which can be hot must be made hot,
provided the heating agent is there" (de Gen. et Corr.324b8-9). A given object could
be the matter for fire, a club or a walking stick, and in each case the potential is
actualized in a determinate fashion, given the appropriate efficient cause. A tree
branch has the potential for being made into a club, but this can only happen if it is
cut up in a certain way. If, instead, it is burned, one cannot look at the unexpected
event and say that the potential was actualized in a strange way. Rather, a different
potential was actualized, the wood's potential for fire. Lightning is an unexpected
event, but when it occurs it will always cut or bum the wood when it strikes a tree
branch. The cause is unexpected but the effect is predictable, given that efficient
cause. Thus, the provision for a specific efficient cause is contained within the idea of
each potential, and potential cannot be said to be indeterminate in this sense.
As a theoretical construct (a choice among the many determinate possibilities
presented to reason and the senses), potential is determinate--it is a potential for
something in particular. When the potential is actualized in a different way, 'it' is
really not the same potential. It is rather a potential for something else, which
depends on the given efficient cause. Thus the term 'potential' is always a determinate
referent in that it points to a particular potential of a thing, and that potential is
always actualized, given the particular efficient cause which is thought in the concept
of that particular potential. If potential were regarded as one of the senses of being,
and yet as other to the actual in an unqualified sense, there would be no science of
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potential, and perhaps no science at all, for science is predicated on the determinacy
of potential. Accordingly, the only thing indeterminate in potential is what will
actually act on a thing. But looked at in one way, this was never really present in
potential, just as the entire plan of the relations of objects in nature is never contained
within each object, though the rationality and order of that nature, and, in a sense the
grand plan of what would happen if any one of the infinite number of possible
efficient causes were to act on it, are contained within the potentiality of each object.
If a potential is a potential for something, then in a sense it contains the efficient

cause--that is, it is a potential with respect to a certain efficient cause. With respect to
another efficient cause 'it' is a potential for something else. It would be more correct
to say that there are distinct potentials contained in matter, each depending on a given
efficient cause to be actualized. Each one is determinate. "[M]atter when acted upon
by the same forces will receive the same determination; its indeterminateness does not
involve contingency. There will be exceptions to rules, but these exceptions will be
according to rule" (Ross, 77). The indeterminacy is not in the potential, then, but in
one's failure to know what efficient cause will supervene and actualize one of the
many potentials contained within a thing. The indeterminacy is in one's failure to
know the grand plan.
This is illustrated by Aristotle's view of chance events. The name 'chance' is
given to "the unforeseen meeting of two chains of rigorous causation" and Aristotle
considers this an indeterminate event (Ross, 78), but nothing particularly mysterious
occurs. The proximate causes of the event are apparent to science--for example, the
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real, and not incidental, cause of the collection of the bill (Ross, 76) is the man's
requesting that it be paid when he meets the debtor--and the reasons for each man's
presence are causally known--and so this event does not constitute true indeterminacy;
it is not other to scientific investigation. From the perspective of a human being, the
reason for the confluence of these two chains of events may be imperceptible, but this
does not rule it out from a God's eye view, and this sort of unexpected confluence
could, of course, be ascribed to almost any event if the causal chains are extended far
enough into the past.
In order to maintain the indeterminacy of matter and potential against such an
argument, Aristotle brings up the notion of a final cause, the natural end of a thing.
"[T]he final cause is an end, and that sort of end which is not for the sake of
something else, but for whose sake everything else is" (Meta.994b8-10). According to
this argument, a thing has a potential for a given end, and the indeterminacy of the
potential lies in whether the effect will happen for a given end. The classification of
an event as indeterminate, then, depends on two arguments: that purpose can be seen
in all events that have a purpose and that some events can be other to the rationality
of physis and techne. One problem with the argument for purpose is that matter can
always be looked at in different ways. One might say that a ship has a potential for
moving in accordance with human purpose, and that when a storm blows it off
course, the event is a chance event and without purpose, and it is indeterminate
because "in this sort of causation the number of possible causes is infinite" (Phys.
198a4). But in this case the cause of the ship's motion is determinate--the wind of the
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storm--and the potential of the ship is also determinate, in that it might be said to
move in accordance with either human purpose or a storm's purpose--natural purpose.
Even though the purpose of the latter is not evident, this does not preclude its
existing. We need not see it, but it is nature and "nature is a cause, a cause that
operates for a purpose" (199b32-3). This purpose can be seen as the final cause, and
hence a final cause is not lacking in unexpected events that happen according to
nature, such as a storm. Natural events have a final cause in their form. The purpose
of a natural thing is its form. Thus, the formal and final causes in nature may be
thought to be identical, just as the formal, final and efficient causes may, in some
cases, be identical. A potentiality that is actualized without any sort of final cause is
unnatural, and if such an event were possible, then potential could be said to be
indeterminate. But, as I will show, none of the supposedly indeterminate events are
contrary to nature.
The determinacy of potential is judged by its results. These results are
determinate and predictable, and so no potential is wholly indeterminate (except
perhaps the infinite). Potential is limited. It is not infinite. Things regularly produce
the same things in the same ways. And just as an accident cannot be an accident of an
accident, potentiality is also limited to one-step of a process. A thing does not always
exist potentially, but it depends upon something else--it is determined by something
else. Earth is not potentially a man, and perhaps not even when it has become seed.
Something is potentially something only "if nothing in the thing acted on--i. e. in the
matter--prevents it from becoming [for example] a house, and if there is nothing

70

which must be added or taken away or changed," and if nothing external hinders it
(Meta.1048b36-1049a12). The limiting of potential "shows that the concept of
potentiality and all that depends upon it may not be stretched too far" (Edel, 44).
Potential is actualized in regular ways, it is limited in extent and it is an object of
science. Given this regularity, it becomes uncertain wherein potentiality's
indeterminacy lies.
But if potentiality can be explained entirely in terms of causes and determinate
expectations, it would seem to have the character of necessity. If this were true, then
all change would be necessary. This, however, is precisely what Aristotle wishes to
avoid, for if potential were necessary, then all change would be essential, and it
would be impossible to determine a thing, as it would be continually changing in its
essence. Aristotle's concept of the accidental is an attempt to overcome this problem.
The accidental seems to demonstrate the indeterminacy of potential, and so it is a
concept necessary to prevent everything from being necessary, to allow potentiality
some leeway.

CHAPTER THREE--THE ACCIDENTAL
An accident is said in many senses, and in one sense it is indeterminate. The
accidental results from matter and both matter and accidents are "indeterminates"
(Meta.1049bl). In this respect, an accidental term is unlike other things in that "it is

not true to say that it itself is identical with its essence, for both that to which the
accidental quality belongs, and the accidental quality, are white, so that in a sense the
accident and its essence are the same, and in a sense they are not" (1031b22-28). The
accidental is, in a sense, that which is not self-present, for it is not identical with its
own essence; its being is pure otherness, for it is other to its own essence. But from
a different perspective this otherness disappears. The essence of white is not the
same as that of the man or of 'white man', but it is the same as the quality 'white'.
Since the accidental is, in a way, not the same as its essence, it is unknowable in this
respect. The accidental per se is not a possible subject of knowledge, for knowledge
is of the necessary (Nic.Ethics.ll39b22). "[T]he object of scientific knowledge cannot
be other than it is" (Post. An.74b5), but the accidental is only that way by chance.
Science depends upon necessity, in that a predicate "is invariably predicated strictly
and not accidentally of the subject, for on such predication demonstrations depend for
their force" (83a19). Without demonstration there is no science, for scientific
knowledge is "a state of capacity to demonstrate" (1139b31--cf. 7lb9-23). Thus, the
accidental cannot be a subject of science and, for this reason, the accidental qua
71
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accidental is indeterminate.
But a less prejudicial way of describing its indeterminacy (for the accident is
only unknowable when taken in a certain sense) would be to compare it to potential.
Potential is known by analogy, by looking at what results from it, and so the
unexpectedness of the accidental demonstrates the indeterminacy of potential and
matter. The occurrence of accidental causes shows that matter does not produce
something entirely predictable. The term 'accident' is confusing, because it is used in
two very different senses. Accidents are either essential or inessential, an ontological
division that also separates that which can be known from that which cannot be
universalized, and therefore cannot be known. The former type of accident indicates
those things that change in the world according to the nature of things; the latter
indicates those things that do not happen in virtue of their own nature. In the primary
sense, the essential, accidents are the differentiae in the world, the diverse phenomena
that allow one to distinguish between individuals of a kind or species, and the
majority of these accidents, seen in terms of their own essences, happen always or for
the most part, as rule-governed determinations of substance. Accidents, in this sense,
change, while the prime substance remains the same. The second kind of accident is
the inessential, and "[o] f accidents that are not essential according to our definition of
essential [i.e., necessity] there is no demonstrative knowledge; for ... an accident,
[in this sense] may also not inhere" (75a20). When accidents occur, but not by virtue
of their own nature, the cause is said to be accidental or incidental, and it is this sort
of event that is thought to demonstrate the indeterminacy of potentiality.
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The status of the accidental in Aristotle is paradoxical, in that it suggests an
exception to the all-inclusiveness of the scientific system and the regularity of the
universal, and yet it is, in a sense, the linchpin of the entire system. The existence of
the accidental is necessary for Aristotle, if change is to be compatible with science
and definition, for it opens up a second major category of being that can change while
a unity is retained in the unchanging substratum. At times, Aristotle limits the
accidental almost to the point of non-existence. He says that "the accidental is
practically a mere name" (Meta.1026bl4). And, "the accidental is obviously akin to
nonbeing" in that "things which are in another sense come into being and pass out of
being by a process, but things which are accidentally do not" (1026b20-24). But the
accidental has a definite role to play in limiting the place of the unordered in
Aristotle's system. The presence of the accidental seems to show that all things do not
proceed from necessity or according to a deliberate purpose. To accidental results
"there corresponds no determinate act or faculty," the cause is accidental (1027a6).
The supposed indeterminacy of the accidental arises from the way in which it
comes about. Although its source can be said to be matter, the manner in which it is
caused is characterized as indefinite. All matter is indeterminate, but, oddly, not all
matter is the cause of the accidental. The accidental is limited, shunted away from
that which is eternally necessary, to the order of the contingent, and delimited even
there. The cause of the accidental is limited to the matter that is capable of being
otherwise than it normally is (1027a14-15). Sight, for example, can do nothing but
see, and so it is an example of a matter that "cannot do but what nature [meaning the
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essence of the thing] determines" (1227a24). However, necessity does not govern the
actualization of most kinds of matter, for many things happen only for the most part,
and not always (1027a10), and so, many things can provide the matter for the
accidental. The matter of the accidental, then, is indeterminate in the sense that it can
be otherwise; it is not limited to one possible result.
This distinction is important for Aristotle, because an explanation of the
accidental according to causes would reduce all things to the necessary. "If there were
causes and principles of the accidental of the same kind as the essential, then there
would only be necessity_ Chance and the possibility of a thing's either occurring or
not occurring are removed entirely from the range of events" (Meta.1065a10). This
seems perfect for science, in that it requires that events be absolutely regular, i.e.,
necessary, but this regularity would eliminate both the indeterminacy of potential
(and, thus, the possibility for change or perhaps freedom) and the determinacy of
things with respect to their essential characteristics. The existence of potential is
dependent on the existence of the accidental. Without the accidental, potential would
be entirely determinate, and one would be pardoned for regarding it as having a form.
The consequence of explaining the accidental in terms of rational causes is that
it becomes essential, and one loses the ability to contest the Heraclitean position.
Change of the accidental would be essential change. However, the world of accidents
is constantly in flux. If accidents were essential, then essential change would be
constant, and things would never have a unity; their essential aspects would always be
changing. There would be no permanence, no unity and hence no possibility of
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referring to some 'thing' as itself, for permanence of substratum or essence is the sine
qua non for definition and science. The essential (substance) must be safeguarded for

definition to be possible, because "only substance is definable" (1031al). If substance
cannot be defined, then nothing can be defined. Definition and science would be
impossible, because 'accidental' characteristics would be part of the essence of a
thing, and no definition is possible of characteristics which are not only innumerable,
but also ever-changing. Heraclitus would be right. There would only be otherness and
indeterminacy.
The idea of accidental change permits some essential unity to remain while the
accidents change, in alteration, increase, and diminution. The essential things are
unaffected by the alteration of their accidents, their differentiae. Thus, Socrates
remains Socrates even when he becomes musical, for the accident of his musicality is
conceived of as distinct from his essence. Alteration is caused by sensible causes, by
causes that do not affect the underlying substance, but only the accidental qualities of
the thing, that is, the accidents that are possible for its essence. "Everything, we say,
that undergoes alteration is altered by sensible causes [i.e., causes are seen in the
world], and there is alteration only in things that are said to be essentially affected by
sensible things" (Phys.245b2-4). Eternal substances do not undergo alteration because
they are unaffected by sensible causes. When changeable substances undergo
alteration, their essence changes, in the sense of the formula plus the matter, that is,
their actual condition changes, but their essence, in the sense of their rational formula
alone, does not change. Only the accidents alter, because the essence, as a rational
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formula, is unaffected by sensible things. This separation grounds the possibility of a
rational, determinate unity (i.e., a substantial rather than material unity) that is
retained throughout most change. The sensible world is composed of "affective
qualities," such as sweetness, wetness and color (Phys.244b2-7), and when a thing
changes in one of these respects, the change is said to be accidental, for it is not
necessary that the thing change in such a way. The essence of the thing is unaffected.
When a man becomes pale, the tone of his skin is changed but his essence remains
the same. This delimitation of the indeterminacy of the accidental secures the
determinacy of the essence of the thing itself. Thus, by placing indeterminacy in
accidents, Aristotle preserves determinacy in the unchanging essences in things
(Meta. l010a3). The essential is unaffected, for the substratum remains while the

accidents change.
This provision is made in response to Heraclitus. If the accidental were
included within the definition of a thing--if it were essential--then the concepts of
change and unity would become problematic. All change would become essential
change. Each part of a thing would be essential to its identity, and since things in the
world are constantly in flux, they would be constantly undergoing essential change. It
would no longer be possible to refer to the thing as something definite, as a unity.
The unity in time necessary for definition is essential unity, and this must not include
'inessential' accidents, characteristics that do not occur according to rule. Aristotle
avoids the problem by arguing that a thing is not a unity in every sense, for part of it
is inessential or accidental, such as its paleness or musicality. Paleness has an essence
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in virtue of itself, but this is not part of the essence of the thing of which it is
predicated. Accidents are excluded from the essential substance of things; they cannot
be essential to their remaining what they are, for these accidents are innumerable and
continually in flux, and their attachment to the essence of things would abolish the
possibility of the unity grounding their identity. Thus, Aristotle invokes the idea of
the essential substratum in order to ground his belief in the simultaneous existence of
change and intelligibility, predicating the unity of things on this substratum. The
accidental is, in an important sense, not a part of the unity of a thing, for in referring
to a thing it is the essence that is indicated. The accidental, by definition, is other to
the essence of the thing, and, indeed, to its own essence, and this otherness, this
transcending of the unity required for knowledge, makes it inherently unknowable, at
least according to Aristotle's abstract account of the accidental. Aristotle's notion of
what parts of a thing belong to its essence may be problematic or even arbitrary, but
theoretically, the accidental will always be separable from the essential. When the
parts change, one isn't left to wonder where the unity is--it is in the essence. This
idea provides a response to the Heraclitean view of a world shot through with change.
Aristotle protects the essences of the world from such change, and thus, for him,
things change, yet retain a unity in their essence.
Consequently, the accidental is carefully demarcated from the essential. It is
written about as if it were a noble, or inert, gas: it has no effect on the essential and
the essential has no effect on it. But it carries a heavy burden, for it becomes the
locus of the indefinite. The accidental (in this sense) is not essential, for it has to do
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with the contingent, and the contingent can have no effect on the substratum or
essence of a thing. A person's paleness can have nothing to do with her essence.
Because an accident is not essential and does not affect a thing's essence, it is
indefinable. Definition strives for essences--universals--but the accidental is
individual; it does not admit of generalities. Discourse is of the universal, and hence
it does not even make any sense to talk of the accidental at all, for it seems to admit
of no essence.
In Jorge Luis Borges' story "Funes the Memorious," the character Ireneo
Funes is able to remember every leaf, every stone, and every person that he has ever
seen. This ability comes to him when he is paralyzed, but it would be more accurate
to say that it paralyzes him, for it leaves him completely unwilling to use language of
a general sort to refer to the multifarious accidents in the world. He rejects Locke's
hypothetical language in which every tree and every bird has its own name as too
general. He is almost incapable of using any general Platonic forms at all, for he
realizes that the naming of a particular dog, for example, would do irreparable harm
to the individuality of the dog, because its identity at three-fourteen p.m. (seen from
the front) is not the same as at three-fifteen (seen from the side), and so on. The
infinity of different things makes it impossible to give names to them all or to do
justice to their individuality. Words destroy this individuality by using universals to
explain many different individuals, without accounting for the accidents that
individuate them. As Aristotle argues, language by the very nature of its universals
covers over the individuality of the accidents of this world. A knowledge, or a
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language, that attempted to do justice to this radical individuality, however, would
soon immediately find itself paralyzed by the infinite number of names required for
such a project. A knowledge of individuality, based as it would be on the accidental,
is impossible for Aristotle, because of its radical indeterminacy. Hence, Aristotle
argues that no knowledge is possible if there is nothing except individuals. The
accidental is radically individual, and, thus, radically indeterminate, and so it can
never be the subject of the universals of discourse, for it has no general essence in
itself. A Heraclitean world, by Aristotle's reading, would be characterized precisely
by the failure to divide itself between the realm of ever-changing accidents and stable
substance, and so, such a world would have none of the stable essence required for
subjects of scientific knowledge. Thus, Aristotle argues that there can be no definition
(or scientific knowledge) of the accidental.
Aristotle's limitation of change to the accidents upholds the possibility of
definition, for it allows essences to remain a unity, but it seems to problematize the
notion of how one determines essence. Change occurs in the world of the accidents,
and yet this is somehow tied to the nature of a thing, because natural change occurs
according to the nature or essence of a thing. The difficulty is cleared up by the
distinction between the two senses of accidents. Accidents change according to
necessity or by chance, depending on whether they are essential or inessential. An
explanation of a thing is, then, made regressively, or analogically, by examination of
how it changes. Change in itself is not impossible to understand, as long as it happens
regularly, for regular change shows the nature of a thing. Change is determinate when

80
it happens for this nature, and so it cannot be explained when it does not happen for
this nature--when the final cause is absent from the change. A thing is known in terms
of its causes. Hence, change that happens according to the nature of a thing or
according to the purpose of a rational or non-rational agent can be understood, and it
does not constitute a difficulty for Aristotle; it is not indeterminate. The contribution
of the essence of a thing to its change is the purpose or telos of the event--the nature
of the thing. In essential or natural change, a 'map' of the change remains, and the
change is limited in such a way as to leave the thing the same in its essence. This
shows how change can explain the nature of a thing

while~being

limited to the

accidents. When Aristotle refers to the indeterminacy of the accidental, then, he
means the type of accidents that do not happen in virtue of their own nature--the
events that do not seem to have a natural cause. These events--changes of the
accidental qua accidental--do not exhibit determinacy, for they do not have a telos.
The indeterminacy of the accidental, however, constitutes a major problem for
Aristotle.
The dilemma is that the scientific system is both supported and called into
question by the presence of indeterminacy. If, upon close examination, one finds that
the determinacy in the system becomes total--i.e., when one leaves out the qua or the
'in a way' distinctions and gets to the per se causes and effects--then the distinction
between the essential and the accidental disappears. As I have shown, this either
obviates the possibility of knowing the essence of things or reduces being to one. On
the other hand, if any indeterminacy and otherness actually remain in the ordered
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system, this indeterminacy and otherness bring into question the idea of sys-tem, for
they show that it is not all-encompassing. The order would not seem to go into all
spheres. This is problematic in that reason, as Kant says, demands totality. The very
term 'system' suggests this need for wholeness and totality, for the prefix 'sys' means
whole or complete. Thus the success of Aristotle's project depends on his containing
the accidental within his system, without eliminating its indeterminacy. He attempts to
do this by his usual distinction between the senses of a term.
In a sense, the final cause of the accidental is different from the final cause of
the essential. The final cause of the accidental is indeterminate (chance), while the
cause of the essential is nature or purpose. In this sense, the accidental cannot be
explained scientifically, for the indeterminacy of chance and spontaneity forestalls any
possible explanation, any determination of the four causes (aitia--explanations).
Science, like nature, is of that which is always or for the most part, but chance causes
happen neither always, nor for the most part, and so science cannot inquire into them.
Aristotle argues that there is no science of the accidental, because there is no
possibility of explaining it in terms of its causes.
The sole difference between the causes of necessary and accidental things is
that the accidental seems to lack a final cause and an attachment to the purpose of a
thing. Unlike the accidental, the essential or necessary is required for something to be
what it is. There is a primary cause of the essential--that for the sake of which a thing
happens. The essential has purpose; the accidental has none. The accidental is a
predicate of a subject, but not an essential one, not one that can be defined. A
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necessary predicate indicates that which is essential for something to be what it is.
Accidental predicates, on the other hand, attach to a subject only contingently--as in
'musical Socrates'. They do not happen in virtue of "the subject's nature" but rather
in virtue of something else (Meta.1025a13-32). As a result there is no definite final
cause of the accidental. Aristotle calls the cause chance or spontaneity, both of which
are indefinite. The accidental lacks order because there is no telos in it. The order is
absent from an accidental event; it does not happen for a purpose.
The order of an ordered action must be put into it by nature or a rational
agent. As Kant writes, a scientist must supply the order of an experiment in order to
gain any fruitful results, for "reason has insight only into that which it produces after
a plan of its own" (Critique of Pure Reason, Bxiii). The scientist sets up the rational
conditions that will allow him to discern something positive and ordered from the
experiment. The system put into it causes the order and necessity present in the
outcome. Similarly, for Aristotle, an action that is deliberated upon produces an effect
that is necessary and not accidental. It is a consequence of the telos that was put into
the action. An action that occurs according to nature has its own telos already. An
accidental result does not seem to contain this deliberation or natural purpose and this
logical relationship of cause and effect. The cause is at first imperceptible. As a
result, "there can be no scientific treatment of [the accidental]" (1026b4-5). To justify
this assertion Aristotle appeals, as usual, to experience. There is no science that
concerns itself with the accidental (1026b5).
But this is not the result of mere chance. The reason for the lack of a science
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of the accidental is logical, for science deals with the order that is itself ordered and
usual. "[A] ll reasoning proceeds from necessary or general premises, the conclusion
being necessary if the premises are necessary. Consequently, if chance conjunctions
are neither general nor necessary, they are not demonstrable" (Post.An.87b23-26).
The accidental is neither necessary nor general, whereas science deals with that which
is always or for the most part (Meta. l065a5). The accidental happens neither always
nor for the most part, it does not have a logos, and its causes are said to be chance
and spontaneity. Hence, the accidental seems to admit of none of the regularity
necessary for science.
Initially, it would seem as if this indeterminacy were irrecoverable. In the

Rhetoric, Aristotle claims that "[t]he things that happen by chance are all those whose
cause cannot be determined, that have no purpose, and that happen neither always nor
usually nor in any fixed way" (1369a31-3). This would be a chance appropriate to its
nature, a chance that could never be investigated by science. The accidental seems to
fit this idea perfectly, for it is "that which is neither always nor for the most part"
(Meta.1026b31-2). It is irregular, and therefore it would seem unsuited to the practice
of science. Moreover, the accidental occurs neither necessarily, nor purposefully,
although it is often in the realm of purpose. Aristotle gives the example of a man
collecting subscriptions for a feast who achieves his erstwhile end of collecting money
when he goes to a certain place with another purpose in mind (Phys.196b33-197a4).
He collects the money by accident, for the collection was not his purpose in going
there. The event lacks a telos, and so it is considered to occur by chance. "By chance
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. nothing comes to be for an end" (Post.An.95a9). There is a telos in the situation,
but it is unrelated to the result, and thus the result is considered accidental, and the
cause, chance. But the presence of the telos in the situation is important, for chance
events operate in the sphere of purpose. The situation is accidental because no logos

is involved in the effect. The operative purpose, to drink, has nothing to do with the
effect, the collection of the money. However, looked at in another way--a less

sophistic way--the causes of the accidental can be determined as natural or purposeful,
and even the final cause can be determined for accidents in nature.
The indeterminacy of the accidental problematizes any notion that the entire
system is ordered. Hence, Aristotle retreats from his blanket characterization of the
accidental as indeterminate, giving it three causes, and perhaps a fourth. The final
cause is missing for an accidental event, but only when it is characterized in a certain
way. When the specific event is examined more directly, however, the final cause is
always present. The event does not of its own nature happen without a cause; it must
be constructed in a certain way for the cause or lack of cause to be determined. The
important point, however, is that the event has an order when examined in a certain
way. The effect as accidental depends on the way in which the action is viewed.
Here again a theoretical construct is involved in the characterization of the action as
accidental or purposeful. An event that is looked upon as accidental is never
accidental in any fundamental sense. The accidental is a mere theoretical construct
which Aristotle sometimes chooses to apply to an event. The collection of the money
for the feast is called accidental because no necessary causes required that that
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confluence of events occur--that when the man went to the place he would collect the
money. If he had planned to collect the money there, then the action would not be
said to be accidental. In this way, Aristotle separates the accidental from that which is
explainable. "The accidental is not necessary, but indeterminate, and of such a thing
the causes are unordered and indefinite" (Meta.1065a25). The cause of the collection
of the money is uncertain, for it does not follow from some rational plan. But the
characterization of something as accidental depends on how one looks at the event. As
Aristotle says, the accidental is "practically a mere name" (1026b14). It is not
something real in every sense, for its indeterminacy vanishes when one looks at it in a
different way. By looking at the accidental in this equivocal fashion, as he also looks
at matter, potential and being, Aristotle is able to introduce indeterminate concepts
that, nonetheless, allow for scientific investigation. Hence, the idea of the accidental,
and the indeterminacy of the accidental, provide a way to escape the Heraclitean
problem, in addition to the Parmenidean.
The telos of the 'accidental' appears when the event is examined directly, in
terms of its real causes. Aristotle cites the example of Socrates becoming musical as
an accidental change. The essence of Socrates does not change when he becomes
musical, and so the change is said to be accidental because it is not an essential
change. However, the change has nothing to do with the essence of Socrates, but
everything to do with his musicality. Therefore, the event should be examined in
terms of the determinate aspect which changes when Socrates becomes musical. This
event proves to have a telos. Socrates studies music for the purpose of becoming
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musical, and so the change in him from 'unmusical' to 'musical' is determinate--there
is a telos in the change. The quality 'musical' is only accidental in that Socrates
himself need not be musical. He would still be Socrates if he were unmusical. The
same sort of sophistry accounts for the 'indeterminacy' of the person's collection of a
subscription to a feast. Aristotle's description of the event as accidental is
inappropriate. The actual event is the collection of the money, and this does not
happen accidentally. The person in question does not go into a tavern and ask for a
beer and instead get a subscription. Rather, he collects the money because he asks for
it. He hadn't known that he would get the money at such a place, but there is still a
telos in the actual acquisition of the money--he asks for the money or the other person

purposefully gives him the money. The way in which the event is viewed determines
whether it will be considered accidental. Moreover, even in the Aristotelian
characterization of the event, the absence of the final cause is specifically noted and
so Aristotle's silence about the other causes should suggest that they are in fact
present.
Although Aristotle often claims that the accidental is indeterminate, its causes
obscure, he does not wish to give free rein to the indeterminacy, for if there is
anything within the system that is indeterminate or unexplainable, then one begins to
wonder whether any order applies to the system as a whole. The total character of the
system comes into question. To respond to this, Aristotle indicates that the event is
not as indeterminate as it seems. He shows in various places that an event 'caused' by
chance has determinate causes, is not unnatural, and happens in a fixed way, given a
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particular set of circumstances.
The determinacy of the 'accidental' starts on the level of being. The accidental
does not refer to a new class of being, or to non-being. "[B]oth [accidental and
necessary] are related to the remaining genus of being, and do not indicate the
existence of any separate class of being" (Meta.1027b34-1028a2). A separate class of
being would be other to planned being and would have no order; it would therefore
be indeterminate. But this is not the sort of otherness that Aristotle would allow.
"[A]ll things that come into being arise from what actually is," he argues (de Anima,
431a3). They all arise from a being that is essentially ordered, and this includes the
accidental. Hence, one of the meanings of being is the accidental (1026a34). Though
it is not essential or necessary being, it is not different from being. The commonness
of the various senses of being (they are all said with respect to one sense) permits
discourse on all beings, whether accidental or necessary. As a kind of being, the
accidental also has unity. Some things "are called one in virtue of an accident"
(1015b35) and this is a primary sense of the word 'one'--"that which is one by
accident" (1015b16). Thus, the accidental in the senses of being and unity (which may
be the same) is neither other nor indeterminate.
Nor are the material, formal and efficient causes of the accidental unknown or
indeterminate. The cause of the accidental is said to be chance or spontaneity, and
these, as we have seen, are thought to be unordered and indefinite. But the
characterization of chance as a cause is a theoretical construction, a way of speaking
about the event. Chance events are thought to have no necessity, but the necessity or
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lack of necessity of an event is dependent on a certain set of assumptions made about
the event. A saw must be made of iron, for example, "if we are to have a saw and
perform the operation of sawing" (Phys.200al2). This necessity is a theoretical
construction, for "[w]hat is necessary then, is necessary on a hypothesis; it is not a
result necessarily determined by antecedents. Necessity is in the matter" (200a13).
The accident is only an accident when looked at in a certain way. It might be
necessary if examined in a different way, for the necessity of an event is in the
hypothesis. By saying that necessity is in the matter, Aristotle means that when
something is taken as a particular kind of matter, with a particular potential, certain
things are necessary for that potential to be actualized. Matter, looked at in a
particular way--and matter is always for something in particular--has a particular
necessity attached to it. But examined in another way, that necessity disappears. It is
not necessary that a saw have a wooden handle, for it could be made of bone; but it is
necessary that it have a handle, and so the matter of the handle can be seen both as
necessary and as incidental to the saw, depending on how one considers the matter.
The same is true of the accidental. The characterization of it as accidental, and its
cause as chance, depends on the theoretical construct, the hypothesis, used in
determining the event. In virtue of one thing, something may be accidental, but in
virtue of its own nature it may not be. In this sense, an event is very much the
construction of the observer, for it appears in a certain way, given a certain outlook.
This idea elicits the paradoxical result that there is nothing necessary about the
characterization of something as accidental, or about the characterization of the
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accidental as indeterminate.
The indeterminacy of the accidental, then, depends on how an event is
characterized, and, as I have said, this primarily refers to the absence of a final
cause. An event 'caused' by chance is actually determinate in the sense that it can be
entirely explained. The purpose of the event may be imperceptible, for the causes of
many natural events are not at first apparent, but this does not preclude its existence.
In examining accidental events, Aristotle often shows that the direct cause of the event
is not chance at all. When a ship headed for Italy ends up in Africa, the cause is said
to be accidental. And yet there was indeed a cause, according to Aristotle (Meta.
1025a). A storm caused it. The event is accidental in the sense that there was no
deliberation and hence no apparent logos to the situation. The matter that caused the
accidental could have been realized in another way (1027a14-15). The ship could have
sailed, as expected, to Italy. But the situation suggests that the accidental does not
constitute an exception to the determinacy of potentiality, for it holds despite the
innumerable possible ways in which the potential might be actualized. If a storm
comes, the ship will be blown a certain way. If the winds hold as usual, the ship will
be able to reach Italy. Nothing indeterminate is suggested here, for the actions happen
in predictable ways, given a certain efficient cause. The material cause is the ship; the
efficient cause is the wind and the sea; the formal cause is perhaps the final location.
As a natural event, the event even has a natural purpose. Hence, Aristotle backtracks
in many ways from his initial characterization of the accidental as indeterminate, all
but showing that the accidental is in fact determinate and caused, if not purposeful. It
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is determinate even in the most basic aspect of our relation to the accidental in logos,
for "every occurrence is definite in so far as it is a subject of discourse" (Edel, 30).
The determinacy of matter and potential further problematizes the notion of the
indeterminacy of the accidental.
The accidental is made possible by the putative indeterminacy of the potential.
And yet the transformation of matter's potential into a particular happens normally in
a lawful manner. Change is consequent upon a material cause in an ordered manner.
A potentiality in a material substratum is actualized by some agent in a determinate
fashion. There is no passing into non-being in this change from state A to state B;
there is no (unqualified) non-being that prompts the change. "Everything that is
produced is something produced from something and by something, and that the same
in species as it" (Meta. l049b27). The potential is limited in several respects. A thing
does not produce something other than it in genus or even species (cf. chapter four).
Things are not produced in a random fashion; they change from specific materials into
other determinate things. The accidental is thought to demonstrate the indeterminacy
of potential, but as we have seen it should be regarded as the necessary imperfectly
understood; it fits within the context of nature. The accidental is limited, for it is not
non-being, or a different kind of being, it is not other in form to the actual, and it
does not arise from non-being.
The irregularity supposedly introduced by the accidental is only a sophistic
kind of indeterminacy, an indeterminacy in a sense, but not in a primary sense. The
indeterminacy of the accidental is only such in a way of speaking or in a way of
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thinking about it.

11

11

[T]he accidental is practically a mere name (Meta .1026b 14). Even

purpose is not necessarily lacking in it. The fact that Socrates is musical is termed
accidental, because he could be otherwise. If he were not musical, he would still be
Socrates. But this does not mean that 'musical' is somehow indeterminate. Accidental
qualities are seen as always changing, and therefore ungraspable, undefinable.
Definitions reach for essences and the accidental qua accidental has no such essence.
But Socrates becomes musical by taking a series of steps for the purpose of becoming
so. Being musical is an inessential quality but it, nonetheless, signifies something in
particular, and is arrived at as the result of a purpose. There is an essence to
'musical' as there is to 'pale' and so on. This essence is a theoretical kind of essence,
a definition of each quality, the idea of which changes as the mind develops a new
explanation of it. Aristotle argues that it is accidental that the pale man becomes
musical, for he need not be that always or for the most part (1027all). But this
explanation is sophistic in that when the pale man becomes musical he does not do
that qua pale, but rather qua unmusical. A quality or event is termed accidental only
by avoiding an examination of its proximate causes.
A stronger case for the indeterminacy of the accidental is made in Aristotle's
discussion of the housebuilder. For him, the accidental is found in the innumerable
attributes produced unintentionally in the making of the house (1026b6). The house
may be pleasant to some people, unsightly to others, and so on, but these attributes
are incidental to the plan effected in the building of the house. They are not part of
the logos of the house that the builder provided. The builder did not intend to produce
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the attributes that arise along with it, and because they were unplanned, they are
accidental. And yet they are not somehow uncaused, if they are really a part of the
house. The builder organizes the materials, and by his art gives a rationality to the
nature of his product, but he has no control over how other people look at the house.
The house is, in a sense, reconstructed by each viewer, for each time it is examined
new accidental qualities seem to appear, but the thing itself still constitutes a standard
for the truth of the observations. The solution might be that the plan of the housebuilder is responsible for whatever order it has, but that a plan cannot cover the
totality of possible relations between things, and, looked at in a certain way, different
qualities will always arise. This perhaps introduces an entirely different problem. A
better approach would be to restrict this examination to that which is really an aspect
of a thing.
Seen in this regard, an accidental change is either an entirely sophistic way of
looking at an event--for example, when the pale man becomes musical, the paleness
has nothing to do with the change--or has to do with a lack of order or plan in the
event as a whole. If the first case is dismissed as irrelevant, then it is the unplanned
confluence of certain events that causes the accidental. When the person collecting
subscriptions for the feast 'accidentally' finds the man for whom he was looking,
there is a determinate cause of the event. No apparent reason exists for the confluence
of events that caused the meeting, or rather innumerable reasons exist for it, but to
say that the cause is indeterminate is inaccurate. "That which is per se cause of the
effect is determinate" (Phys. l96b26). Further, the failure to introduce logos into the
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event does not mean that it is really absent in something seen as accidental. Aristotle
argues that nature is a cause, a cause that happens for a purpose, but this does not
mean that the final cause of a natural event is always evident. To argue that the
storm's blowing a ship to Africa, for example, is accidental is to say that the natural
event (the storm) had no purpose. The lack of purpose is seen only when looking at
the event from the point of view of the ship's captain. The event certainly has a final
cause when examined from the point of view of nature. The characterization of the
event as accidental depends entirely on the perspective used to examine it. Thus, an
order is present in what is called accidental that cannot always be determined, but
which, nevertheless, seems to exist.
The accidental, thus, is determinate in many senses, and as in his discussion of
matter and potential, Aristotle limits the otherness and indeterminacy of the accidental
in order to make science possible. Science requires that the being of the accidental be
ordered, that its causes be determinate, and that it change in a predictable way.
Science, for Aristotle, has an ontological basis; reason is present in things (Meta.
984b 14). The existence of the accidental would cast this into doubt, if it were really
indeterminate. But, as Aristotle argues, it is not even a special kind of being. We can
dismiss accidental being (1027b36). The being of the accident is not in a special
category. It is not other. It is not indeterminate. It has a form by which it is
understood. Consequently, the determination of a cause as accidental is a hypothesis.
That which is called accidental is not something completely indeterminate. There is no
string of accidental causes receding into the void. The accidental and accidental
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causes are not prior to the essential, for if "luck or spontaneity is a cause of the
material universe, reason and nature are causes before it" (1065b2). There is nothing
that suggests that the accidental has somehow arisen from non-being, or that it has
been uncaused. The characterization of an event as accidental or incidental often has
nothing to do with its real causes. Aristotle describes the incidental cause of a
person's health as a flute player. But this is only a manner of speaking. The
flute-player is also a doctor, and it is qua doctor that he heals the person. The fact
that he plays the flute has nothing to do with it (Phys.197al4). To call the flute-player
an incidental cause of the person's health is, then, a mere sophistic phrasing. It is not
a cause at all. Thus, seen in terms of their essences, accidental events are
determinate.
Aristotle's account of the real status of accidental causes demonstrates their
illusoriness. Luck is defined as "an accidental cause at work in such events adapted to
an end as are usually effected in accordance with purpose" (Meta.1065a30-32). Luck
happens in events in which a final cause is present but not actualized. As a result,
"[t]he causes from which lucky results might happen are indeterminate; and so luck is
obscure to human calculation and is a cause by accident" (1065a33). The
indeterminacy of luck is, however, completely undermined in the next clause of the
sentence. Luck "in the unqualified sense [is] a cause of nothing" (1065a34, cf. Phys.
197a5-14). Thus, chance is merely a way of speaking of an event that does not
happen in accordance with the norm. The causes of what happens by chance are seen
as indefinite, but this is not in fact the case. The indefinite cannot be an object of
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knowledge, for it is "inscrutable to man" and not open to discourse (197a10). This
sort of indeterminacy is merely a way of speaking, however, for it might be thought
in a way that "nothing occurs by chance" (197all). Chance as an incidental cause is
not "strictly ... [and] without qualification" the cause "of anything" (197a12-14).
Chance events, strictly speaking, have an external cause and may occur "for the sake
of something" (197bl8). Even the final cause is not ruled out. The cause of the
accidental is not indeterminate at all. Thus, the supposed indeterminacy of chance, the
accidental, potential and matter is merely rhetorical. In each case there is nothing
indeterminate or unexplainable about it.

CHAPTER FOUR--MONSTROSITY
Monstrosity, however, would seem to constitute a real example of
indeterminacy and otherness. But in fact it is neither. Monstrosity is an example of
ordered being; its causes are determinate and so Aristotle is able to account for it
scientifically. Aristotle, initially, sets up the idea of monstrosity as an example of the
unexplainable, the unnatural, a failure of nature. This failure defies reason, for "in
natural products the sequence is invariable, if there is no impediment" (199b25). If
nature inevitably works toward its end, then monstrosity must be caused by some

other. The production of monsters would seem to bring natural necessity into doubt,
and to introduce otherness and indeterminacy into the rational world system.
Monstrosities are thought to be other in species to that which produces them. Thus,
humans are said to give birth to oxen-headed progeny. But Aristotle claims that
nothing is produced that is other in species from what produces it. If the monstrous
is what it appears to be, then it is an example of the indeterminacy of potential.
The question is whether monstrosity is natural, for if it is natural, then either it
is explainable by natural causes and purposes, or an unbounded indeterminacy is
included within nature. And if it is unnatural, then otherness obtrudes upon nature
and the entire basis of science--regularity and the absence of radical otherness within
nature--is undermined. The monstrous thing seems different in form from its be getter,
and consequently, it seems as if monstrosity is an exception to nature.
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writes of nature in a very different sense from monstrosity, describing it as if it were
an ideal subject for science, saying that "[t]hose things happen by nature which have a
fixed and internal cause; they take place uniformly, either always or usually"
(1369a35-bl). Certainly, monstrosity does not always take place. Hence, if nature is
defined according to the probability of something happening, then monstrosity is
unnatural. A woman does not often give birth to oxen-headed progeny, and so there
would seem to be no natural explanation for it. But, on the other hand, a woman just
as rarely gives birth to an Einstein or a Jesse Owens. And yet exceptional children are
not deemed monstrous. Thus, the probability theory of nature--the theory that it is
what happens all or most of the time--does not explain nature very well, for it does
not prescribe the cut-off point for natural products--is it what happens more than 70%
of the time? or more than 80%?
A better explanation of nature would be according to genus and species. That
which is natural does not change in genus or species from that which begets it. By
this account, monstrosity would have to be a real otherness in kind or species for it to
be called unnatural. The Greeks explained monstrosity by reference to some kind of
otherness, and this explanation was used for exceptional children as well, indicating
that a similar source was involved. They looked to the gods to explain offspring that
were so exceptional or monstrous that they seemed entirely other than their parents.
And in experience, some children "are not even like a human being but a
monstrosity" (767b5). Nature produces natural things, and hence such an unnatural
monstrosity would seem on the face of it to be produced by something indeterminate,
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something other than nature. The material, final, formal and efficient causes would
appear to come from nowhere, if they are even present. The scientist looks to nature
for explanations, even with respect to monsters (Preus, 202), and so if the
monstrosity were unnatural, it would be unexplainable, indeterminate and other. But
the monster is not other than his parents in any essential sense. As Foucault says,
"monsters are not of a different 'nature' from the species themselves" (The Order of
Things, 155). Although, in monstrosity, "nature has in a way departed from the
type," (767b7) it has not produced something unnatural. The type is determined not
by an examination of matter itself, for that is known only by analogy (191a8), but
rather by examining the actual products of the matter. What happens most often is
considered natural. But in so far as this probability theory of nature lacks the definite
distinctions required for (pre-modern) science, a better test of nature would be
whether the product is of the same genus and species. Aristotle's statements on this
subject are ambiguous because he uses the term 'physis' or 'nature' in several ways.
On the one hand, monstrosity is unnatural in that nature concerns that which happens
for the most part. Thus, he says that something becomes more monstrous the more it
departs from 'nature' , referring to a type.
But Aristotle argues that monstrosity is not really unnatural. The monsters are
"none of the things they are said to be" (769bl 7). They have only a similarity to oxen
or sheep, but they remain human. They have not changed in their essence or species.
Nature cannot produce anything other in species. Potential is indeterminate, but in a
limited sense. It does not produce anything which entirely departs from the type. It
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does not produce an other in kind. "It is impossible for such a monstrosity to come
into existence--! mean one animal in another" (769b22). An ox or a creature that is
part ox-part human cannot be born from a human. A monster cannot actually be of a
different species or genus than its begetter. Thus, monstrosities are not unnatural and
they even happen for determinate reasons, though in a sense they are a departure from
nature. The point is that although the monstrous belong "to the class of things
contrary to nature" [taken in one sense] they are not contrary to "any and every kind
of nature," but only to the usual (770b8). The usual is certainly not the best definition
of nature.
Monstrosity is not an example of otherness of species, and so it is not a real
change in nature at all. In any case, "even what is contrary to nature is in a certain
sense according to nature," provided that the formal cause has not overcome the
material nature (770bl6). And the causes of monstrosity are not indeterminate. Some
kinds of monstrosities "generally happen in a certain way but may also happen in
another way" (770bl2). It seems as if the other kinds are merely imperfectly
examined. Aristotle writes scientifically about movements relapsing and offspring in
multiple births getting in the way of each other, and so on. Thus, monstrosity, for
Aristotle, does not represent a true case of indeterminacy, in that even monstrosities
occur in fixed ways and for rational reasons. It is not an otherness beyond nature; it
does not involve a change into another nature (770b24). One cannot argue that it is
indeterminate merely because the causes are imperceptible, for many causes are
difficult to detect, and yet a unified material substratum remains, as in generation and
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destruction.
The explanation of monstrosity seems to fail only in the realm of purpose. In
nature there are mistakes, Aristotle argues, and "monstrosities will be failures in the
purposive effort"; such a failure is due to the corruption of some principle (199b4-7).
Yet, this argument can be challenged by reference to the concept of nature. As
Aristotle says, monstrosity is not contrary to any and every kind of nature. The
monster is not different in species from its begetter. Since monstrosity is not utterly
contrary to nature, and nature's purposes are not always apparent, the final cause
cannot be ruled out. Nature is a cause that acts for a purpose, and monstrosity is not
unnatural. Therefore, the final cause is not absent from monstrosity.
The absence of a final cause is also thought to make potentiality, matter and
the accidental indeterminate. This idea, however, is problematized, for Aristotle
often removes the distinction between the formal and final causes. It is not always
clear that the final cause, or even the efficient cause, is different from the formal
cause. This is why the accidental is not thought to have form. If it had form then
it would have a formal cause, and it would be determinate in all senses. But since
it does in fact have form in itself--it can be perceived in nature--it must have a
formal cause. It comes to be something, and though this something is not in the
essence of the thing to which it is related, it happens determinately according to
the efficient cause which effected the event. The formal cause may be thought in
place of the final cause, as is implicit from Aristotle's account in book V of the
Metaphysics. He states, reducing the example to nature, "as regards the things that
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are or come to be by nature, though that from which they naturally come to be or are
is already present, we say they have not their nature yet, unless they have their form
or shape. That which comprises both of these (matter and form) exists by nature, ...
and not only is the first matter nature ... , but also the form or essence, which is the
end of the process of becoming" (1015a2-10). This reduces the four causes to three.
Things have their nature when they have their form or essence. The efficient cause
acts on the material cause to produce a form, which is the end of the thing, given that
particular efficient cause. The situation cannot be shown to have no telos, for as Kant
says, "it is yet quite impossible to prove in any given case that an arrangement of
nature, be it what it may, serves no end whatsoever" (Critique of Pure Reason,
A688/B716). The ends of nature are often mysterious even in Aristotle. As he says,
things in nature are not always seen. However, he supposes that "action for an end is
present in things which come to be and are by nature" (199b8). The works of nature
are not so narrowly seen as to exclude things ill-suited to survive. Nature interferes
with itself in such a way that it sometimes actualizes the potential monstrosity that lies
within. Natural things are too often seen in terms of their unity. But it is their
otherness that allows them to change in themselves--internal change is change qua
other, as Aristotle says. Natural things have many different parts, which carry on
different operations. Just as there appears to be no grand plan that dictates when a
man will collect his subscriptions, there also appears to be no grand plan governing
the operations in a thing, at least in terms of the synchronicity of the parts. Speaking
generally, things within the body move at different rates and perhaps, as Aristotle
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suggests, they occasionally collide--movements relapse and offspring get in the way of
each other. There is nothing unnatural about this. The otherness in every change must
be emphasized. But the monstrosity is not other to the human--it is not another species
or genus--and it is not indeterminate. It is merely a product of an unusual combination
of natural processes. Monstrosity is produced in this sense like the truth and falsity of
the logos apophantikos, through combination and separation (1051b2).
In some sense the accidental and the monstrous are both the results of a
determinate potentiality. Seen in one way, something might be a potential for a baby
and in another way as a potential for oxen-headed progeny. When potentiality is
looked at in a narrow sense--as a potential for something in particular--it seems
indeterminate, because that potential is not always actualized. But looked at in another
way one particular potential of the matter is actualized in a determinate way, given a
particular efficient cause. This never involves an otherness of species or genus.
Monstrosity, therefore, is not a change in nature, and as a natural event it has its final
cause in its form. The unification of the third and fourth causes (the formal and final
causes) means that the potential, the accidental and the monstrous are all determinate;
they do not even lack a purpose. Thus, Aristotle rules out the possibility of true
otherness or indeterminacy in his system.

CHAPTER FIVE--THE INFINITE
The infinite is the indeterminate par excellence, and so Aristotle's treatment of
the infinite is highly instructive of his attempt to place the putatively indeterminate
within the narrow limits of his scientific system. The infinite (apeiron) is the
unbounded, the unlimited, that which cannot be contained within limits. It is by its
very nature alien to all limitation, outside of the notion of limit. As such it is
destructive of all knowledge. Aristotle is explicit on this point. Those who argue
that no limit is placed on the reduction of essences "destroy science; for it is not
possible to have this till one comes to the unanalysable terms. And knowledge
becomes impossible; for how can one apprehend things that are infinite in this way"
(994b21). Infinity cannot be allowed into the system of essences, for "if the kinds of
causes had been infinite in number, then also knowledge would have been impossible;
for we think we know, only when we have ascertained the causes, but that which is
infinite by addition cannot be gone through in a finite time" (994b27). The infinite,
then, is representative of Aristotle's fear of indeterminacy, for it is by its nature
indefinable and thus if his solution to the problem of indeterminacy and otherness is
to include them within his scientific system, then, his treatment of the infinite will
most severely test this theory, for it seems, least of all, compatible with any
limitation. The question, essentially, is whether Aristotelian science can allow for the
actuality of the unbounded, unformed infinite. If so, then something would remain
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unexplained within Aristotle's ordered system (sys--whole, complete), despite its
accounting for the indeterminacy of potentiality, monstrosity, matter and the
accidental, and the system would no longer be total. Infinity is a linguistic term, and
so it is definable, but its reference suggests something that cannot possibly be grasped
by definitions; it suggests some(no)thing beyond the capacity of language. The
infinite can never be a subject of discourse (and hence limited and graspable). It can
never be seen in its totality and explained, for explanation requires a knowledge of
limits and what is external to the thing, and limits can never be given to that which is
itself the totality, to that which has no limits, for that would require going outside to
where there is no outside.
Aristotle's solution to the problem of the infinite is similar to his equivocal
solution to the problem of change (Edel, 12). He places the infinite in potentiality
and denies that it can have actual existence. The "infinite is a cause in the sense of
matter," and therefore it exists potentially, but not "as a separate thing" (207b35208a7). It is never actual; it exists only as potential, but as a special kind of
potentiality. "[T]he infinite does not exist potentially in the sense that it will ever
actually have separate existence; it exists potentially only for knowledge" (1048b13).
Although every potential is thought to be actualizable, what is actualized necessarily
takes on some form and becomes determinate--limited--and thus the infinite by
'definition' cannot become actualized.
The infinite, for Aristotle, admits of no stripping of its qualities like the
indeterminate and the other. In a sense, it can never fit into the determinate world,
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for it is too big for it. "Complete actualization of the potential infinite is impossible"
(Edel, 48). The infinite is never actualized because only some definite part of it may
be generated. "Potentiality is always for something determinate" and the infinite (or
unbounded) by definition cannot be determinate (44). But this discussion of the
infinite is nonsensical, since it is never even strictly predicable of a subject, for that
would constitute a limitation of the unlimited. Hence, "to speak of infinity is to
misuse the concept" (55). Nevertheless, as with potential, the accidental, matter and
the monstrous, Aristotle includes the infinite within the determinate not only in
discourse but also as a concept with "meaning only within a finite whole" (ibid.). The
infinite is seen as an inexhaustible process--for example, in a periodic function like
the day. "Infinity only has meaning as the matter for certain changes or processes
within it or any portion closed off within it" (ibid.). However, this is not to say that
change can be infinite, for Aristotle argues
"that no process of change is infinite: for every change, whether between
contradictories or between contraries, is a change from something to
something. Thus in contradictory changes the positive or the negative, as
the case may be, is the limit, e.g. being is the limit of coming to be and
not-being is the limit of ceasing to be . . . a process of change cannot be
infinite in the sense that it is not defined by limits" (241a27-b12).
All change is defined by limits, so all change is finite, except in the sense of a
circular or periodic process. The universe as a whole is often considered the infinite,
though the characterization of this as the infinite implies a certain conceptual ability to
sum up the whole from outside. But for Aristotle, the whole cannot be viewed as
unlimited. He "views the world as a whole as a determinate system" and thus the
infinite, if it is present at all, must be inseparable from a determinate process (ibid.).

106

The infinite is used in a determinate fashion. This is a requirement of discourse.
"Every subject is determinate, it is something, and as such, a possible subject of
discourse. The concept of infinity implies as prior some determinate subject" (Edel,
56). In discussing the infinite there is always the need of predicating it of a particular
determinate subject (64).
To speak of infinity requires that it be limited and this is also a requirement for
its actualization. Aristotle agrees with Parmenides that the whole is limited (59). As
such the totality is not infinite, and can be a subject of discourse. But the infinite
cannot fit within this whole, and therefore it cannot be actualized. This
characterization is necessary to exclude sheer indeterminacy from the rational
world-system. The infinite cannot exist as such, for that would allow indeterminacy
within the system. "[N]othing infinite can exist; and if it could, at least the notion of
infinity is not infinite" (994b28). Thus, Aristotle does not even believe that the
whole, the universe, is infinite or graspable as a whole, and he does not even allow
for the unboundedness of the notion of infinity. As Simplicius says, "the determinate
whole is finite. If, therefore, it were possible to take a greatest of determinates (i.e.,
the whole), what was taken would necessarily be indeterminate and infinite," (62-3)
and so Aristotle allows only a limited and decidely determinate part of the infinite into
his system.

CHAPTER SIX--CONCLUSION
Thus, Aristotle excludes indeterminacy from his system entirely, although it
appears in a manner of speaking. In each case, he examines things as
determinate--whether potentiality, the accidental, the monstrous, or the infinite--and
finds a unity and being in all things that can be discussed. The other, in a limited
form, is necessary for his system of change, and yet it is nonetheless an other that is
determinate, that is one and that is not other in being. It is a matter for discourse.
Whether there are levels of indeterminacy below discourse is unclear, in that Aristotle
attempts to define everything from the lowest parts of animals to human feeling, and
to ascribe to each a particular cause. Even spontaneous generation, in his limited
understanding, is described scientifically, as a generation from soil or mud.
Indeterminate things, this account suggests, are merely imperfectly understood.
"Though Aristotle's language often gives the impression that the indeterminate or
infinite is unknowable, he certainly does not seem to mean an Unknowable to which
we can in some other way than by knowing somehow or other penetrate" (Edel, 71).
The unknowable is excluded from his system, and, in fact, as matter and potential,
the accidental and the infinite, the indeterminate becomes the very basis for his entire
scientific system.
The fact that things happen in unusual ways is true in a sense, but looked at in
another way, nothing ever happens in an unusual way. A given efficient
107

ca~se

always

108
produces the same effect on matter of a sort, and the result is never other in species.
"[I]t is a law of nature that the same cause, provided it remain in the same condition,
always produces the same effect" (de Gen. et Corr.336a28); "a given germ does not
give rise to any chance living being, nor spring from any chance one; but each germ
springs from a definite parent and gives rise to a definite progeny" (Parts of Animals,
641 b28) and even if this progeny is considered a monstrosity it is not other in species
to its antecedent matter--it remains unified in some essential respect with its matter.
This necessary form of causation suggests that if the totality of causes for events were
known, then all events would be necessary and there would be no indeterminacy at
all. Certain things appear accidental when looked at in a certain way, but this is
caused not by the lack of purpose in the event, but, rather, by the inability to see a
grand plan of the relations of all things, and of the relations of things within a natural
object. Such a plan is absent from Aristotle's account of science, and this can be said
to be the cause of any indeterminacy found in the system. A system of natural laws
would better explain the relations between things, though it too would be forced to
attempt a grounding of the simultaneous presence of indeterminacy and science.
However, even without this grand plan the indeterminacy of the system
disappears, for events are always seen, when examined directly, to happen according
to nature or purpose. The problem for Aristotle is that when the accidental is seen as
caused, it becomes necessary and the unity of a thing once again becomes
problematic. In this discovery, which is not at all inconsistent with Aristotle's view of
science, the identity of a thing is unveiled as a mental product and its 'real' unity is
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dissolved. This is not as inconsistent with Aristotle as it seems, for he often relies on
the qua or 'in a way' distinctions in order to make many of his points. The conceptual
framework used in thinking an object and its qualities seems to determine whether a
thing is one. As a result, the judgement of something as something becomes to some
extent like Nietzsche's assertion of the identity of Homer, an aesthetic judgement. The
characterization of something as matter, potential or accidental is a theoretical
construct, a particular way of looking at something, and that thing has an essence that
is given to it; it is not inherent in the thing. The accidental, the monstrous, matter and
potential are all indeterminate if taken in a certain way, but determinate if taken in
another way. They are theoretical constructs and the model used to describe them
determines whether, like being, they can be inquired into. Characterizations of the
system always depend on how one looks at a particular thing, but when examined
directly the indeterminacy always seems to disappear. The disappearance of
indeterminacy, however, is a fundamental problem for Aristotle.
If indeterminacy is barred from his system, Aristotle's solution to Parmenides

is thrown into doubt. The determinacy of the world-system suggests that Aristotle is
not the pluralist that he claims to be. Aristotle argues that being is said in many
senses. But he does not (and cannot) say that there are different kinds of being, and
he founds from within a rigid limit between being and not-being, just as he limits
from within the borders of the finite universe. There are many ways of looking at
being and of speaking about it, but this does not mean that there are really different
kinds of being. The indeterminacy of the potential, for example, is only one way of

110

speaking about how beings change. Aristotle says that being is said in many senses
but all refer to one central point, to one physis, "to one definite kind of thing"
( 1003a34). The unity of the senses of being is predicated on the fact that each sense
refers to substance, to a definite kind of thing, and this seems to suggest that being is
one and determinate. Everything refers to a de.finite kind of thing, and unity and order
are characteristic of all things.
Consequently, the basis for the disappearance of indeterminacy in the
accidental, matter, monstrosity and potential becomes clear. Being itself is ordered
and determinate. The determinacy of Aristotle's system is total, if examined in this
direct way, and the characterization of Aristotle as a pluralist becomes somewhat
problematic. As a scientist Aristotle wishes to explain every change in the world. This
requires that there be some ultimate basis for science, some foundational order and
unity that perdures throughout all its manifestations. The commonality of the senses of
being provides this basis, for the senses of being all refer to one definite kind of
thing. "There is one kind of being which is in the strictest and fullest sense--viz.
substance; and all other things are simply by virtue of standing in some definite
relation to substance" (Ross, 156). Indeed the idea that the various senses of being
actually refer to different kinds of being, and not just to different ways of looking at
the same thing, is cast into doubt. If, as Aristotle maintains, a unity is present in all
the senses of being, then perhaps being is one. Thus, by emphasizing the universality
of science and the oneness to which all the senses of being refer, Aristotle becomes
open to charges that he, like Parmenides, is a monist, though certainly his brand of
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monism should not be conflated with that of Parmenides, for Aristotle does reduce all
things to one substance. But there are several kinds of monism, as Aristotle himself
notes, in the first few pages of the Metaphysics, and Aristotle's falls under this
category because of its theoretical subsumption of all into the category of the limit, to
order, and to unity, and because of its absolute exclusion of otherness and
indeterminacy, taken radically, from the realm of being.
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